Corporate social responsibility and strategic relationships

Hino, Yoshifumi; Zennyo, Yusuke

doi:10.1007/s12232-016-0267-y

Cited by 30 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Equation implies that Firm 1 decreases α 1 with an increase in α 2 . Based on Hino and Zennyo's (2017) definition, in the case of a strategic substitute, a negative impact emerges by increasing a rival's variable. Hence, concerning the best response function, in this case, there is no incentive to set a positive weight.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As an efficient firm can choose to assign negative values to the weighting of a rival's profit in our model, a future advantage can be obtained through the commitment device of α . As illustrated by Hino and Zennyo (2017), in the strategic substitute case, the firm chooses aggressive strategies, and in the complementary case, the firm does not choose any aggressive strategy under the delegation game. Intuitively, the inefficient firm also chooses a negative α to obtain larger market shares.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hino and Zennyo (2017) demonstrate the strategic relationship of a delegated performance indicator. When the firm places weight on social welfare, the choice of α is a strategic complement.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Expanding the mixed oligopoly model, Matsumura and Ogawa (2014) introduce corporate social responsibility, including social welfare in a manager's objective function. Arya, Mittendorf, and Ramanan (2019) and Hino and Zennyo (2017) consider the manager's objective function, which is composed of their firm's profit and the consumer surplus.…”

Section: Related Literature On Relative Performance Evaluation With Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

What level do disadvantaged firms weight rivals' profits in relative performance evaluations under quantity competition?

Hamamura

2020

Manage Decis Econ

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In the context of quantity competition in relative performance evaluation, this study explores the weight placed on rivals' profits through two asymmetry cases—the cost difference between firms and the sequential choice of weight placed on their rivals' profits. We identify high‐cost firms in the cost asymmetry, and followers in the sequential case of weight decisions are labeled “disadvantaged” firms. Whereas the classical literature demonstrates that the weight placed on a rival's profit is negative under quantity competition, we provide theoretical evidence that the disadvantaged firm assigns a positive weight to the rival's profit under asymmetric cases.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literature On Relative Performance Evaluation With Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

What level do disadvantaged firms weight rivals' profits in relative performance evaluations under quantity competition?

Hamamura

2020

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Furthermore, some authors jointly consider a few elements in the same model, such as the interest in consumer surplus and in environmental damages (Lambertini & Tampieri, 2015) or interpret CSR as an incentive contract regarding either consumer surplus or social welfare (e.g. Hino & Zennyo, 2017).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pareto-Superiority of Corporate Social Responsibility in Unionised Industries

Fanti

Buccella

2019

Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice

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Economists believe that a firm’s engagement in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is motivated by objectives beyond increasing profits. Using a duopoly framework with convex technology and an industry-wide union-setting wage at the central level, this work shows that, when owners cooperatively select a level of CSR engagement, profits under CSR are higher than under standard profit maximisation; thus, the simple self-interest of firms’ owners leads to the adoption of CSR. Moreover, the union, consumers, and the overall social welfare in the presence of CSR activities are higher than without CSR. As such, the social concerns of firms’ owners yield a Pareto-superior outcome. JEL: J51, L13, M14

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The optimal level of corporate social responsibility based on the duopoly model

et al. 2020

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This paper constructs a duopoly model considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) and market's sensitivity to CSR (e) and analyzes the equilibrium results, the condition of CSR implementation and the optimal CSR level (β *) of Model CC (two enterprises implement CSR) and Model CN (only one enterprise implements CSR). The results show that β * is affected by competitors and e. e, marginal cost (c) and cost difference affect the equilibrium results and the comparative results. Reducing c and improving e can promote social welfare. Consumer surplus under Model CC is highest. CSR has a negative effect on social welfare under certain conditions.

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Corporate social responsibility and strategic relationships

Cited by 30 publications

References 33 publications

What level do disadvantaged firms weight rivals' profits in relative performance evaluations under quantity competition?

What level do disadvantaged firms weight rivals' profits in relative performance evaluations under quantity competition?

Pareto-Superiority of Corporate Social Responsibility in Unionised Industries

The optimal level of corporate social responsibility based on the duopoly model

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