2020
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3566296
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Corporate Power over Human Rights: An Analytical Framework

Abstract: This paper presents an original framework designed to systemize understandings of corporate power over human rights. The framework disaggregates four sites of this power: corporations have direct power over individuals' human rights, power over the materialities of human rights, power over institutions governing human rights, and power over knowledge around human rights. This disaggregation is derived primarily from the work of Barnett and Duvall, and focuses on effects of corporate activity, rather than the W… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 22 publications
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“…Vice versa, if NAPs practice across states does not follow NAPs guidance, this is also potentially informative. If divergences between NAPs guidance and actual NAPs processes are observed uniformly across all states this might be because, for instance, experimentalist governance is essentially less likely in the area of business and human rights than in other policy domains or areas of human rights (de Búrca 2017; Armeni 2015; Kenner and Peake 2017; Goldstein and Ansell 2018), for instance, due to greater and universal power differentials between key players (Birchall 2021). Or, if traits of experimentalist governance are observed in some, but not other states' business and human rights NAPs, this might trigger a search for contingent, rather than structural, factors to explain this.…”
Section: Guidance On Business and Human Rights Napsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Vice versa, if NAPs practice across states does not follow NAPs guidance, this is also potentially informative. If divergences between NAPs guidance and actual NAPs processes are observed uniformly across all states this might be because, for instance, experimentalist governance is essentially less likely in the area of business and human rights than in other policy domains or areas of human rights (de Búrca 2017; Armeni 2015; Kenner and Peake 2017; Goldstein and Ansell 2018), for instance, due to greater and universal power differentials between key players (Birchall 2021). Or, if traits of experimentalist governance are observed in some, but not other states' business and human rights NAPs, this might trigger a search for contingent, rather than structural, factors to explain this.…”
Section: Guidance On Business and Human Rights Napsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A key shift over the last forty years has been from a social democratic ordering to what is often termed a neoliberal ordering. This legal ordering creates extreme wealth and poverty and new forms of control and oppression, which are most visible in labor-related and democratic issues (Britton-Purdy et al 2020, 1786Birchall 2021a). Human rights obligations apply to these outcomes because they are the result of legal ordering, and human rights principles provide both for critical avenues and progressive alternatives.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Quite to the contrary, the dominant pragmatic approach, most prominently represented by the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (OHCHR, 2011), has led to remarkable progress towards recognizing human rights predicaments in transnational enterprises, including GVCs. But some important facets of the debate and consequences of its dominant problem definition are largely left out, such as the corporate form (Baars, 2019), corporate power (Birchall, 2021) and legitimation (Scheper, 2019) in the human rights field.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%