2016
DOI: 10.1287/stsc.2016.0021
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Corporate Political Strategy in Contested Regulatory Environments

Abstract: Please scroll down for article-it is on subsequent pages With 12,500 members from nearly 90 countries, INFORMS is the largest international association of operations research (O.R.) and analytics professionals and students. INFORMS provides unique networking and learning opportunities for individual professionals, and organizations of all types and sizes, to better understand and use O.R. and analytics tools and methods to transform strategic visions and achieve better outcomes. For more information on INFORMS… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…These correlations are presented graphically, controlling for state and year fixed effects, using binned scatter plots in Figure 3. Within this subset of the data, I find a positive relationship between legislative competition and political contributions by businesses (Panel a), consistent with prior literature linking legislative competition and campaign contributions (A. R. Fremeth, Holburn, & Bergh, 2016;Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014), and a weak positive relationship between contributions and incentives and subsidies to incumbent firms (Panel b), consistent with prior literature suggesting that campaign contributions can be used as an effective tool of influence by incumbent firms (Dean, Vryza, & Fryxell, 1998). 16 This correlational evidence is consistent with the above theory and suggests that firms are more likely to deploy influence strategies when legislative competition is high and that such strategies are effective in terms of obtaining favorable outcomes in the nonmarket environment.…”
Section: Political Contributions and Lobbyingsupporting
confidence: 86%
“…These correlations are presented graphically, controlling for state and year fixed effects, using binned scatter plots in Figure 3. Within this subset of the data, I find a positive relationship between legislative competition and political contributions by businesses (Panel a), consistent with prior literature linking legislative competition and campaign contributions (A. R. Fremeth, Holburn, & Bergh, 2016;Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014), and a weak positive relationship between contributions and incentives and subsidies to incumbent firms (Panel b), consistent with prior literature suggesting that campaign contributions can be used as an effective tool of influence by incumbent firms (Dean, Vryza, & Fryxell, 1998). 16 This correlational evidence is consistent with the above theory and suggests that firms are more likely to deploy influence strategies when legislative competition is high and that such strategies are effective in terms of obtaining favorable outcomes in the nonmarket environment.…”
Section: Political Contributions and Lobbyingsupporting
confidence: 86%
“…As evidenced by the additional agencies required to approve a foreign firm engaging in M&As in the United States, a foreign M&A raises additional red flags for domestic actors. Fremeth et al (2016) find that it is important when facing organized opposition from stakeholders for firms to use CPA to develop support from elected politicians due to their responsibilities to oversee regulators who have a direct influence on the firms. Recent studies have examined the relationship between market and nonmarket strategies, such as CPA, and MNC subsidiary performance and legitimacy.…”
Section: The Moderating Role Of Cpamentioning
confidence: 99%