“…These correlations are presented graphically, controlling for state and year fixed effects, using binned scatter plots in Figure 3. Within this subset of the data, I find a positive relationship between legislative competition and political contributions by businesses (Panel a), consistent with prior literature linking legislative competition and campaign contributions (A. R. Fremeth, Holburn, & Bergh, 2016;Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2014), and a weak positive relationship between contributions and incentives and subsidies to incumbent firms (Panel b), consistent with prior literature suggesting that campaign contributions can be used as an effective tool of influence by incumbent firms (Dean, Vryza, & Fryxell, 1998). 16 This correlational evidence is consistent with the above theory and suggests that firms are more likely to deploy influence strategies when legislative competition is high and that such strategies are effective in terms of obtaining favorable outcomes in the nonmarket environment.…”