Corporate Ownership and Control in Russian Companies: Trends and Patterns

Dolgopyatova, Tatiana

doi:10.1057/9780230801516_11

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Although shareholding by a handful of private investors is regarded as one of the peculiarities of Russian firms against the backdrop of significant decline in state ownership and weak institutional investors, ownership structure of the large and middle-scale enterprises tends to grow more diffuse year by year (Dolgopyatova, 2007;Chernykh, 2008). Moreover, many Russian firms have now hired professional managers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia

Iwasaki

2008

Journal of Corporate Finance

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Using a unique dataset of 730 joint-stock companies, we studied the determinants of corporate board composition in Russia. Despite the widespread image of insider control in the 1990s, a large number of Russian companies now actively appoint outsider directors to monitor top management. The findings reported in this paper strongly suggest that the theories and empirical methods of financial and organizational economics help to pinpoint the factors affecting the extent of outsider directorship. We also found that, among potential determinants, bargaining variables have considerable explanatory power. Furthermore, our empirical evidence demonstrated that Russia's legal system and its peculiarities as a transition economy also exert a certain degree of influence on board composition. JEL classification numbers: D21, D23, G34, K22, L22, P31

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia

Iwasaki

2008

Journal of Corporate Finance

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“…Following a turbulent period of corporate conflicts, dominant owners appeared. In 1995 less than 15 percent of industrial firms had a shareholder with a majority stake (Dolgopyatova 2005, 7). By the mid-2000s, approximately three-fourths of firms had such a shareholder (Dolgopyatova 2010, 85–6).…”

Section: Supply and Demand For Law In Post-soviet Russiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case of Post-Soviet Russia

Gans-Morse¹

2017

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Studies of property rights overwhelmingly focus on whether states expropriate or protect property, overlooking the crucial issue of whether private sector actors will use state institutions. By contrast, I argue that the “supply” of formal legal institutions often fails to ensure firms will rely on the state for property rights protection. Instead, firms frequently avoid formal legal institutions and turn to illegal strategies based on violence or corruption. Whether firms adopt legal strategies depends on: (1) firm-level practices and beliefs that impede the use of law, (2) the effectiveness of illegal strategies, and (3) coordination problems resulting from firms’ expectations about each other’s strategies. Drawing on interviews with firms, lawyers, and private security agencies, as well as an original survey of Russian enterprises, I illustrate how “demand-side” factors led to a surprising increase in Russian firms’ reliance on formal legal institutions over the past two decades. The findings suggest that comprehensive understanding of property rights and the rule of law requires not only attention to state institutions’ effectiveness, but also to private actors’ strategies.

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“…The background to the growing research interest in CEO turnover in Russia is threefold: first, as Dolgopyatova (2007) points out, despite the insider-favourable privatisation policy of the early 1990s, most equity capital of Russian enterprises is now owned by private outside investors, suggesting that many CEOs do not own their companies but are employed as management professionals. Second, aging of the so-called 'red executives' has given momentum to delegating company management to new generations in the new century; in 1997 the average age of top managers was nearly as high as their retirement age, with the proportion of CEOs older than 60 exceeding 28%.…”

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Organisational culture and corporate governance in Russia: a study of managerial turnover

Abe¹,

Iwasaki²

2010

Post-Communist Economies

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In this article we investigate the possible impact of ownership structure and corporate performance on managerial turnover using a unique dataset of Russian corporations. We argue that Russia is regarded as a country with a highly authoritarian and collectivism-oriented national culture and this peculiarity is the key to disentangling the puzzle of the statistically weaker relationship between firm performance and CEO renewal in Russian firms. We deal not only with CEO dismissal but also managerial turnover within a company as a whole. By conducting multinomial analysis that incorporates both factors, we found a significant relationship between firm performance and CEO dismissal, while, consistent with most previous studies, a standard logit analysis of CEO turnover revealed no clear relationships. We also found that the presence of a dominant shareholder significantly increased the likelihood of turnover of the whole management team, while foreign ownership tended to cause partial (CEO only) turnover.

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Corporate Ownership and Control in Russian Companies: Trends and Patterns

Cited by 4 publications

References 6 publications

The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia

The determinants of board composition in a transforming economy: Evidence from Russia

Demand for Law and the Security of Property Rights: The Case of Post-Soviet Russia

Organisational culture and corporate governance in Russia: a study of managerial turnover

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