Corporate Lobbying in Antidumping Cases: Looking into the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act

Abstract

antidumping, lobbying, protection, Byrd amendment,

Political Activity and Firm Performance within Nonmarket Research: A Review and International Comparative Assessment

“…Some MNEs start greenfield investments in foreign countries for which they have to deal with political risk in sovereign territories (Puck et al, 2013). MNEs also lobby their home governments for protection from foreign competition (Evans & Sherlund, 2011;Lee & Baik, 2010). These instances raise the importance of political activity as a conduit for competitive advantage (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994).…”

“…However policy performance, which measures the performance of firms in the policy arena, is the least studied of all the outcomes in the literature. Articles examining this type of outcome either study the voting patterns of politicians (Liebman & Reynolds, 2006), the difference between proposed and adopted agency rules (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 2007), government bailouts (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006) or the outcomes of petitions (Lee & Baik, 2010;Marsh, 1998).…”

“…For instance, contributions influence senate roll call vote (Liebman & Reynolds, 2006;Mian, Sufi, & Trebbi, 2010;Steagall & Jennings, 1996) while political connections shape government subsidy decisions (Lee & Baik, 2010;Wu & Cheng, 2011) and protect firms from competition (Evans & Sherlund, 2011). It is therefore plausible to argue based on the literature that informational strategies and any other strategies targeted at policy influence are usually successful.…”

“…There are some others which examine academic earmarks (De Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006), anti-dumping proceeds (Lee & Baik, 2010), government contracts (Witko, 2011), bailouts , trade mission participation and regulations (McKay & Webb-Yackee, 2007). It is thus evident that CPA outcomes have been examined using different variables and constructs, but there is still room for the impact of CPA on other performance metrics to be investigated (Lux et al, 2011).…”

The More You Give, the More You Get? The Impact of Corporate Political Activity on the Value of Government Contracts

“…Research in economics, has also focused on dichotomous political outcomes; for example, in his research on sugar legislation, Stratmann (, p. 615) noted that a “$3,000 sugar PAC contribution maps into a yes vote with almost certainty.” In this case it appears that not only does CPA generate access but that once firms cross a very specific monetary threshold ($3000) their political returns are achieved, or in the case sugar subsidies, even guaranteed. Other research on regulatory outcomes such as trucking deregulation (1987), as well as research on the decisions made by International Trade Commission in case of dumping duties (Lee and Baik ), has also implied that CPA leads to political outcomes that are dichotomous in nature; the politically active firm either succeeds or fails.…”