Corporate Law and Financial Instability

Dual-Gel 4D Printing of Bioinspired Tubes

“…4D printing which introduces a new dimension of time [20][21][22][23][24][25][26] has been previously utilized to create shape-changing structures and devices. [27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40] Besides the well-recognized advantage of easy programmability as a path-based additive manufacturing method, 3D printing also offers excellent potential in material integration and switching of dissimilar materials on demand (in a manner that is analogous to weaving). Among the different types of 3D printing, direct ink writing (DIW) of gels has notable advantages over alternative 3D gel printing methods such as stereolithography in terms of low cost implementation and the ease of incorporating multiple gels at the same time.…”

Comparative Studies between UK-Listed and Japan-Listed Banks

“…show that banks with higher institutional ownership took more risk and suffered larger losses.96 The study of Bainbridge suggests that activist investors may not pursue the same goals as more passive investors, indicating that activist investors are also likely to influence management to take decisions with a focus on merely short-term profitability.97 Overall, these studies support the argument put forward by Kokkinis that incentives provided by an 'agency-theory corporate governance framework' may not be suited for banks as they may provide the wrong incentives, thus exacerbating governance issues. 98 The second observation suggests that external controls are likely to be sufficient in monitoring Japan-listed banks. This would correspond with the conclusions by Hasan and Song, and Erkens et.…”

“…Based on banks' performance during the 2008 Financial Crisis, researchers have observed that banks, where management was more insulated from shareholder demands, or which had less institutional investors, performed better.103 Other researchers have suggested that the agency model, when applied to banks, provide the wrong incentives, which can even worsen the situation. 104 The current legal framework tends to favour shareholders,105 resulting in managers considering the interests of their shareholders when choosing management and risk strategies for their companies. The policy implications of this study indicate that regulators and policymakers may need to consider further improvements towards balancing the interests of the shareholders with the stakeholders under the Company Law and corporate governance codes or guidelines.…”

Moral Hazard and Equity Finance: Why Policy has been Sub-optimal since the Global Financial Crisis

“…A third, and final, set of proposals, including those in the accompanying paper by myself and Rosa Lastra, would adjust the link aligning the interests of shareholders and managers, by imposing additional duties on managers, either through tougher legal requirements, (see Kokkinis, 2018), or by changing the incentive and remuneration terms for management.…”