Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors

Gillan, Stuart L.; Starks, Laura T.

doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00058-1

Cited by 1,409 publications

(879 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Between 1987 and1997 Beasley et al 42 show that these cases were concentrated among smaller firms and were in general restricted to issues like non existing revenues, even though there has been a trend upward. A study of the Financial Executives International 43 has found 224 cases between 1977and 1989, 392 between 1990and 464 between 1998and 2000 identify 492 cases between 1995 and 1999 divided among years as: 44, 48, 90, 106 and 204, respectively. To put things in perspective one should remember that the number of firms reporting to SEC is about 17,000. In other countries there is less analysis of this problem, but it is likely to be important given a lower level of protection of shareholders.…”

Section: The Corporate Scandals Of 2001-2004mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility

Beltratti

2005

Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract

122

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The paper aims at understanding the relation between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). In theory, CG refers mainly to the mechanisms which protect outsiders and ensure an effective working of the firm, while CSR refers mainly to the objective function of the firm and the attention for various stakeholders. The paper discusses these concepts, with particular attention to the relation between CSR and profit maximization. This relation is important to evaluate which actions are truly socially responsible and which actions are simply profit maximization in disguise. The available empirical evidence shows that both CG and CSR are positively related to the market value of the firm. This suggests that in the long run the market mechanism should be able to provide additional resources to those companies which are best at maximizing a widely defined bottom line.

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Section: The Corporate Scandals Of 2001-2004mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility

Beltratti

2005

Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract

122

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“…However, Karpoff et al (1996) found little evidence of improvement in operating incomes post proposals and such proposals were found to have negligible effect on company share values and top management turnover. Gillan and Starks (2000) found that proposals sponsored by institutions or through coordinated activities receive significantly more favourable votes than those sponsored by independent individuals or religious organisations. Institutional investors have increasingly engaged themselves in corporate governance activities, introducing proxy proposals and negotiating with management for improving corporate performance.…”

Section: Shareholder Activismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on theories and mechanisms of corporate governance

Mishra

Kapil

2017

IJAAPE

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This paper aims to review the theories of corporate governance for understanding the theoretical basis of corporate governance mechanisms. Major theoretical studies on corporate governance, including studies done in emerging economies, are included in the review. The paper looks at corporate governance theories from value creation point of view. It is observed that the two perspectives of corporate governance, i.e., shareholder and stakeholder perspectives, are not in contrast to each other but are pointing towards the same goal, i.e., value creation. However, one points towards value creation for shareholders and the other points towards creation of societal value. While reviewing theoretical underpinnings and assumptions for corporate governance perspectives, due consideration has been given to the development of corporate governance mechanism based on various existing theories. A theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and corporate performance has been proposed. Emerging challenges for corporate governance theories have also been indicated. This being a review paper, one of the major limitations is an unintentional omission of some literature because of non-availability or non-reachability. Literature that would have been present in languages other than English could also not been included in the review.

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“…The reason is that institutional investors have larger incentives to monitor and to control the management of bank. Institutional investors, for example, are more likely to collect the votes of other shareholders to push for corporate governance reforms (Gillian and Starks, 2000). Institutional ownership also reduces the agency problem between the controlling blockholder and the minority shareholder, since institutional investors aim at achieving the highest return from their investment and should act in line with the interest of minority shareholders.…”

Section: Foreign and Institutional Investorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

Köhler

2009

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08110.pdf Non-Technical SummaryOwnership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector.The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe. Das Wichtigste in Kürze Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector Matthias Köhler Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)December 2008 Abstract:Ownership structures widely differ across the EU. While large blockholdings dominate in the banking sector in Continental Europe, ownership is widely dispersed in the United Kingdom. These differences have consequences for corporate governance in the EU banking sector. This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the regulatory environment and differences in the ownership structure of banks. Particular attention is put on current trends in the ownership structure of banks (e. g. sovereign wealth funds). The paper is based on a new dataset on shareholdings in listed banks in the EU banking sector.The results indicate that EU regulations have not always improved corporate governance in the banking sector. While shareholder control has been improved by a better protection of minority shareholder rights, the efficiency of the takeover market has been reduced in Continental Europe.

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Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors

Cited by 1,409 publications

References 36 publications

The Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility

The Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility

Study on theories and mechanisms of corporate governance

Blockholdings and Corporate Governance in the EU Banking Sector

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