2007
DOI: 10.1504/ijbge.2007.015210
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Corporate governance in developing economies the case of Egypt

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Cited by 43 publications
(26 citation statements)
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“…Nevertheless, Bremer and Elias (2007) evaluated the progress of corporate governance in Egypt and they concluded that Egypt has several integral factors that hinder the development of corporate governance in Egypt: family-owned or closely held corporations dominate the Egyptian private sector, inefficient and corrupt ridden SOE still play a major role in the Egyptian economy, lack of independence of the board, and abysmal low levels of corporate governance disclosures.…”
Section: Research-article2015mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, Bremer and Elias (2007) evaluated the progress of corporate governance in Egypt and they concluded that Egypt has several integral factors that hinder the development of corporate governance in Egypt: family-owned or closely held corporations dominate the Egyptian private sector, inefficient and corrupt ridden SOE still play a major role in the Egyptian economy, lack of independence of the board, and abysmal low levels of corporate governance disclosures.…”
Section: Research-article2015mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, investigating the Egyptian context is identified as a useful chance to illuminate the prevalence of earnings management, along with its determinants, in an emerging market (namely, a newlyestablished capital market displaying prominent growth). This is because, when compared to developed countries, Egypt"s accounting environment, given the country"s status as an emerging market, reflects numerous points of difference.These differences include the following: firstly, relatively ineffective corporate governance (Bremer and Ellias, 2007); secondly, an elevated level of conformity regarding financial accounting to taxation (Farag, 2009); and thirdly, as described by Moore (1995), a relatively inconsequential part played by the capital market in raising capital. By contrast, the converse for each of these points is true for developed markets such as the US and the UK, including effective corporate governance, a limited level of conformity regarding financial accounting to taxation, and comparatively high importance of the capital market (Defond and Hung, 2004;Myring, 2006).…”
Section: Dr Wael Mostafamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, when comparing developed countries such as the US and the UK to Egypt, a fundamental distinction is that the latter"s corporate governance environment contains no obligatory regulations which are backed up by legal force. Instead of this, Egypt"s corporate governance environment is based on regulation and the encouragement of responsible and transparent business activities which conform to stakeholder interests, which, for Bremer and Ellias (2007), is ultimately an admission of ineffective corporate governance. Critically, this has been shown to accentuate the problem of earnings management within the Egyptian context, a problem which is pervasive, problematic and actively practised in Egypt (Kamel and Elbanna, 2010) when comparatively examined against developed markets.…”
Section: Motivation For Studying the Egyptian Contextmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Strong investor protection creates an environment that deters managers from opportunistic behavior, reduces the risk of mismanagement, and increases shareholders' confidence and their willingness to participate in the capital markets (DeFond & Hung, 2004). Companies from developing economies with weak financial transparency and governance will find it difficult to raise capital and attract foreign investors (Bremer & Elias, 2007). In essence, improved governance creates a signaling effect which demonstrates to citizens, the private sector, and investors that the government is serious about reform (Saidi, 2004).…”
Section: Investor Protectionmentioning
confidence: 99%