Corporate Governance and Innovation

O'Connor, Matthew L.; Rafferty, Matthew

doi:10.1017/s002210901200004x

Cited by 134 publications

(73 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Unfortunately there is little literature on the direct impact of expanded boards or of tighter corporate governance more generally on innovation. While earlier literature found a negative relationship between anti-takeover provisions and innovation investments (e.g., Meulbroek, et al 1990), a recent study (O'Connor & Rafferty, 2012) finds no relation between broad measures of corporate governance and innovation levels once simultaneity is taken into account in their empirical models.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 83%

Entrepreneurial Exits and Innovation

2014

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We examine how IPOs and acquisitions affect entrepreneurial innovation as measured by patent counts and forward patent citations. We construct a firm-year panel dataset of all venture capital-backed biotechnology firms founded between 1980 and 2000, tracked yearly through 2006. We address the possibility of unobserved self-selection into exit mode by using coarsened exact matching (CEM), and in two additional ways: (1) we compare firms that filed for an IPO (or announced a merger) with those who did not complete the transaction for reasons unrelated to innovation, and (2) we use an instrumental variables approach based on the relative level of IPO versus acquisitions market "heat". Our across-and within-mode results are consistent with altered project selection and incentives associated with differing levels of information disclosure to outsiders shaping innovation outcomes. These firm-level results are not explained by an alternative mechanism of inventor-level turnover following exit events.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 83%

Entrepreneurial Exits and Innovation

2014

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“…People temps to exchange trust, help, and feedback with each other [34]. Thus, theory of social exchange refers to a lasting interaction model that contains mutual debt responsibilities and commitments expressed in response to other individual needs, stemming from the informal relationship which generates trust and sense of obligation [35]. Social exchange theory can well explain the dynamic process of resource exchange between two or more people [36].…”

Section: Social Exchange Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Literature Review of Team-Member Exchange and Prospects

Zheng¹

2018

JSSM

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Team-member exchange refers to individual's perception of the quality of working relationships as the whole within the team, which has been recognized by many scholars to the importance of team processes. However, the research of team-member exchange is still scarce. To advance team-member exchange of research, and gradually build and improve the development of team-member exchange theory paralleled with leader-member exchange theory, this paper reviews recent team-member exchange research in aspects of research origins, concept, measurement, theoretical perspectives, function modes and so on, and points out future directions in team-member exchange research.

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“…We use both input-and output-oriented measures of innovation. We use the value of R&D investment scaled by total assets to capture the R&D intensity (He and Tian, 2013;O'Connor and Rafferty, 2012). However, R&D intensity as a measure of R&D activity has a number of drawbacks.…”

Section: Data and Descriptive Statisticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

CEO Incentives, Takeover Protection and Corporate Innovation

Mazouz

Zhao

2018

British J of Management

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This study examines the effects of CEO equity‐based compensation and anti‐takeover provisions on corporate innovation. Using a large sample of US firms over the period 1996–2014, we find that long‐term incentives have a stronger influence on innovation when combined with takeover threats. We also show that equity‐based compensation is more likely to spur innovation for small firms and firms in industries with high product market competition and innovation pressure. However, this effect is somewhat weaker in the presence of anti‐takeover provisions, suggesting that takeover protection encourages managerial shirking even when external competition is high. Finally, in addition to the existing evidence on the valuation effect of CEO equity‐based compensation, we identify innovation as an important channel through which managerial incentives can enhance firm value. Our results have potential implications for shareholders, managers and policymakers.

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Corporate Governance and Innovation

Cited by 134 publications

References 28 publications

Entrepreneurial Exits and Innovation

Entrepreneurial Exits and Innovation

A Literature Review of Team-Member Exchange and Prospects

CEO Incentives, Takeover Protection and Corporate Innovation

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