Corporate governance and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa: An empirical analysis

Board size, corporate regulations and firm valuation in an emerging market: a simultaneous equation approach

“…As financials and utilities are subject to different regulations and also differ in capital structure (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008;Ntim et al, 2012a, b), and following past studies (Yermack, 1996;Guest, 2009), we exclude 111 financials and utilities, leaving us with 291 companies to be sampled. The industrial breakdown of this initial sample is as follows: basic materials with 67 (23%) firms; consumer goods with 36 (12%) firms; consumer services with 62 (21%) firms; healthcare with 7 (3%) firms; industrials with 81 (28%) firms; oil & gas with 3 (1%) firms; technology with 31 (11%) firms; and telecoms with 4 (1%) firms.…”

“…A potential limitation is that it may introduce survivorship bias into the sample selection process. However, the criteria still generated a much larger sample size than what has been used in prior SA studies (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). Arguably, generalisability of the research findings has not been affected by our sample selection criteria.…”

The king reports, independent non-executive directors and firm valuation on the Johannesburg stock exchange

“…This began with the publication of the first King Report (King I) in 1994(King Report, 2002Ntim et al, 2011b). The recommendations of King I were mainly influenced by those of the UK's Cadbury Report of 1992 (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008;Ntim and Osei, 2011). For instance, and in line with the Cadbury Report, King I recommended an Anglo-Saxon style single-tier board of directors, consisting of executive directors and NEDs, operating within a voluntary CG compliance framework (King Report, 2002;Armstrong et al, 2006).…”

“…With respect to the African setting, a number of studies have analysed the impact of CG structures on a number of issues, such as financing decisions of firms (KyereboahColeman and Biekpe, 2006a;Abor, 2007;Abor and Biekpe, 2007), incidences of listing suspensions (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008) and dividend performance (Bokpin, 2011). A limited number of studies have also investigated the effects of different CG mechanisms, such as the frequency of board meetings (El Mehdi, 2007;Ntim and Osei, 2011), ownership structure (Mangena and Tauringana, 2008;Sand et al, 2010), board size (Ho and Williams, 2003;Kyereboah-Coleman et al, 2006) and board composition (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006b;Sunday, 2008) on corporate performance with equally inconclusive results.…”

Effect of Corporate Governance on Performance of Sugar Manufacturing Firms in Kenya: A Case of Sugar Manufacturing Firms in Western Kenya

“…Accordingly, they argued that a positive relationship existed between the duality of these two functions and financial leverage. Separation of these two offices was however sharply challenged by Mangena and Chamisa, (2008), who found that shareholders" returns were maximized when there was duality.…”