Corporate Governance and Control

Becht, Marco; Bolton, Patrick; Röell, Ailsa

doi:10.2139/ssrn.343461

Cited by 174 publications

(97 citation statements)

References 261 publications

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“…The separation of decision rights restricts the warden's discretion and the private use of his/her information advantage. This solution is analogous to board models in corporate governance, in which board members are entitled to some decision rights − usually approval and ratification − whereas the CEO holds the right to propose and implement decisions (Becht, Bolton, & Röell, 2002).…”

Section: Separation Of Decision Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The modes of provision of prison services in a comparative perspective

Cabral

Azevedo

2008

BAR, Braz. Adm. Rev.

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This paper aims to compare the performance of two modes of provision of prison services: public, and with the participation of private companies. There are few empirical studies concerning the alternative modes of governance in this sector, which differs from other public utilities in that there is an absence of network externalities and scale economies. In addition, an understanding of informal institutions is crucial for the performance of the service provider, either public or private. In this paper, we build a comparative analysis of two case studies of similar correctional facilities, one public and the other outsourced to a private company under the supervision of civil servants (hybrid governance structure), both located in the same region of Brazil. We found that the privately operated facility has achieved better performance indicators (in terms of number of escapes, riots, deaths, assistance to inmates etc.) than the public facility, which in part refutes the arguments of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) against private participation in prison services. We conclude that the reasons for these differences are related to lower levels of administrative controls; to the presence of civil servants within the privately operated prison, which contributes to reducing information asymmetries; to greater incentives for the private operator: to monitor employees, to bypass local judiciary constraints and to fulfill contractual obligations.

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Section: Separation Of Decision Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The modes of provision of prison services in a comparative perspective

Cabral

Azevedo

2008

BAR, Braz. Adm. Rev.

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“…11 See for example Bhagat and Black (2001). 12 See Becht et al (2003). 13 See Shleifer and Vishny, op.…”

Section: Corporate Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

The Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility

Beltratti

2005

Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract

122

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The paper aims at understanding the relation between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). In theory, CG refers mainly to the mechanisms which protect outsiders and ensure an effective working of the firm, while CSR refers mainly to the objective function of the firm and the attention for various stakeholders. The paper discusses these concepts, with particular attention to the relation between CSR and profit maximization. This relation is important to evaluate which actions are truly socially responsible and which actions are simply profit maximization in disguise. The available empirical evidence shows that both CG and CSR are positively related to the market value of the firm. This suggests that in the long run the market mechanism should be able to provide additional resources to those companies which are best at maximizing a widely defined bottom line.

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“…205-206) and the references therein. Additional references can be found in Becht et al (2002). court. 7 We thus interpret opportunistic behavior as something that is still within the confines of what is considered legal behavior, but that is nevertheless unambiguously perceived as bad in the eyes of the voters.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Becht et al (2002) also list several papers that estimate voting premia for different countries, but warn that "the studies at best imperfectly control for all the factors affecting the price differential" (p. 76).…”

Section: Corporate Vote Buyingmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests

Neeman

Orosel

2006

International Review of Law and Economics

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We examine the conditions under which vote buying may promote efficiency in an environment where voters have identical preferences with respect to the behavior of their elected representatives (who are subject to both moral hazard and adverse selection). Our results suggest that permission of vote buying may prove beneficial in the market for corporate control and in some types of local political elections.Jel Classification numbers: D72, G32, G34, K22.

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Corporate Governance and Control

Cited by 174 publications

References 261 publications

The modes of provision of prison services in a comparative perspective

The modes of provision of prison services in a comparative perspective

The Complementarity between Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility

On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests

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