Corporate Governance and Competition Policy

Waller, Spencer Weber

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1681673

SSRN Journal

2010

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1681673

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Corporate Governance and Competition Policy

Spencer Weber Waller

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Cited by 2 publications

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“… See, e.g., OECD (2009),Waller (2011), andJacobs (2014).3 Specifically, it is approximately double that of Germany, which shows a similar concentration ratio (see Europe…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Interlocking Directorates and Concentration in the Italian Insurance Market

Bartolomeo

Canofari

2015

J Ind Compet Trade

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The Italian insurance market represents a peculiar and puzzling case within the European Single Market. Since the radical deregulation process in 1992, standard indicators have shown a low degree of market concentration. However, at the same time, Italian insurance costs still remain among the highest in Europe due to the existence of widespread collusive practices, which have been largely documented by both the Italian Antitrust Authority and empirical evidence. The main channel of anti-competitive behavior seems to be related to the exchange of information. To improve the understanding of its structure, our paper studies interlocking linkages among firms operating in the Italian insurance market. Interlock linkages are apparent when single directors sit on more than one company's board. Thus, interlock linkages can be viewed as a systemic channel of information exchange and a potential source of collusive practices. We distinguish interlock linkages occurring within and between groups operating under a common ownership because companies operating in the insurance sector may be organized in multi-brand holdings. Therefore, we disentangle interlocking directorates as holding business strategies from systemic structures that might represent potential threats for the market competition.

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“… See, e.g., OECD (2009),Waller (2011), andJacobs (2014).3 Specifically, it is approximately double that of Germany, which shows a similar concentration ratio (see Europe…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Interlocking Directorates and Concentration in the Italian Insurance Market

Bartolomeo

Canofari

2015

J Ind Compet Trade

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Getting Antitrust and History in Tune

Cheffins

2022

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium

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Antitrust is high on the reform agenda at present, associated with calls to “break up big tech.” Proponents of reform have invoked history with regularity in making their case. They say reform is essential to reverse the baleful influence of the Chicago School of antitrust, which, in their telling, disastrously and abruptly ended in the 1980s a “golden” era of beneficially lively antitrust enforcement. In fact, antitrust enforcement was, at best, uneven, from the early 20th century through to the end of the 1970s. As for the antitrust “counter-revolution” of the late 20th century, this was fostered as much by fears of foreign competition and skepticism of government regulation as Chicago School theorizing. The pattern helped to ensure that the counter-revolution was largely sustained through the opening decades of the 21st century. This article, in addition to getting antitrust and history in tune by drawing attention to the foregoing points, provides insights regarding antitrust’s future direction.

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Corporate Governance and Competition Policy

Cited by 2 publications

References 46 publications

Interlocking Directorates and Concentration in the Italian Insurance Market

Interlocking Directorates and Concentration in the Italian Insurance Market

Getting Antitrust and History in Tune

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