2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.bar.2020.100935
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Corporate environmental disclosure and political connection in regulatory and leadership changes: The case of China

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Cited by 65 publications
(39 citation statements)
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“…Hypothesis (H1) in the model ( 4), the interaction is observed between the quality of CSR disclosure and executive turnover whereby the coefficient of the interaction term resulted in being significantly negative (t = −22.03, p < 0.000), depicting that ensuring quality of CSR disclosure decrease the effect of executive turnover, which supports H1 [71,101]. Hypothesis (H2) in the model ( 5), the interaction is observed between the quality of CSR disclosure and political ties whereby the coefficient of the interaction term resulted to be significantly negative (t = −6.36, p < 0.000) which shows that ensuring the quality of CSR disclosure decreases the impact of political ties [71,102,103]. Table 4 further shows results regarding control variables.…”
Section: Results and Analysissupporting
confidence: 62%
“…Hypothesis (H1) in the model ( 4), the interaction is observed between the quality of CSR disclosure and executive turnover whereby the coefficient of the interaction term resulted in being significantly negative (t = −22.03, p < 0.000), depicting that ensuring quality of CSR disclosure decrease the effect of executive turnover, which supports H1 [71,101]. Hypothesis (H2) in the model ( 5), the interaction is observed between the quality of CSR disclosure and political ties whereby the coefficient of the interaction term resulted to be significantly negative (t = −6.36, p < 0.000) which shows that ensuring the quality of CSR disclosure decreases the impact of political ties [71,102,103]. Table 4 further shows results regarding control variables.…”
Section: Results and Analysissupporting
confidence: 62%
“…Political tensions and forces have been considered to make disclosure part of an "arsenal" of corporate actions, as SEA activities become part of the local political debate in developing countries (Soobaroyen and Mahadeo 2016). In some cases where political hegemony or centralism prevails (such as in China where government intervention is ubiquitous, through channels such as enforcement, licences, quotas, permits and franchise assignment), SEA activities and relevant disclosures are mostly State-led and used as a device for companies to maintain political legitimacy and favouritism (Hofman et al, 2017;Qian and Chen, 2020;Parsa et al, 2021). As such, companies in this context of authoritarian capitalism, especially State-owned enterprises (SOEs), are keen to improve SEA to demonstrate ideological alignment (Li and Belal, 2018) and reduce political risk or political cost (Lee et al, 2017).…”
Section: Contextual Themes and Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Comprehensive environmental strategies by organizations are more common in industries that face stricter environmental regulations [8]. Environmental legislations play a very important role in the development and implementation of environmental strategies and can lead to significant environmental improvement [31,33,34]. King and Lenox [35], after studying chemical manufacturers associations, found that explicit sanctions through government regulation and coercive forces, in the form of sanctions by regulatory bodies, are required for proactive environmentalism.…”
Section: Regulatory Bodies' Concernmentioning
confidence: 99%