Corporate Boards in Europe—Accountability and Convergence

Davies, Paul; Hopt, Klaus J.

doi:10.5131/ajcl.2012.0020

Cited by 46 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Despite the strong pressure for convergence toward the Anglo‐American corporate governance model, these studies show that divergence prevails around the world and that the content of codes is not converging either in European or in emerging countries (e.g., Collier & Zaman, ; Hermes et al, ; Roberts, ; Zattoni & Cuomo, ). Several recent studies focused on this topic confirm that divergence prevails around the world (e.g., Böhm, Bollen, & Hassink, ; Cicon et al, ; Davies & Hopt, ; Johanson & Østergren, ; Zattoni & Cuomo, ). Overall, these results support the limited convergence of the different corporate governance systems toward the Anglo‐American governance model (for a recent review, see Aguilera & Jackson, ).…”

Section: The Evolution Of Country‐level Studies On Codesmentioning

confidence: 89%

Corporate Governance Codes: A Review and Research Agenda

Cuomo

Mallin

Zattoni

2015

Corporate Governance

196

191

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Manuscript Type: Review\ud Research Question/Issue: This study reviews previous country-level and firm-level studies on corporate governance codes up\ud to 2014 in order to highlight recent trends and indicate future avenues of research.\ud Research Findings/Results: Our data show that research on codes increases over time consistentlywith the diffusion and the relevance\ud of the empirical phenomenon.Despite previous studies substantially enriching our knowledge of the antecedents and consequences\ud of governance codes, our study shows there are still several opportunities tomake significant contributions in this area.\ud Theoretical Implications: Agency theory is the dominant theoretical framework, although other theoretical perspectives\ud (especially the institutional one) are increasingly adopted. Future studies should be aimed at widening and combining various\ud theoretical lenses so as to develop new interpretations and a better understanding of governance codes.\ud Practical Implications: Legislators and policymakers should continue to develop and update the recommendations of national\ud governance codes in order to address the potential failures of corporate governance mechanisms in place

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Section: The Evolution Of Country‐level Studies On Codesmentioning

confidence: 89%

Corporate Governance Codes: A Review and Research Agenda

Cuomo

Mallin

Zattoni

2015

Corporate Governance

196

191

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“…The spread of the concept of independence directors around Europe (Davies and Hopt, 2013) and indeed the rest of the world through corporate governance codes has been considered to be an indication of convergence towards the shareholder model. What is interesting is that all codes of corporate governance deal with principles of board composition and independence (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).…”

Section: Shareholder Empowerment and The Monitoring Boardmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proliferation of corporate governance codes in the backdrop of divergent ownership structures

Varottil

2018

Competition & Change

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In the backdrop of the convergence–divergence debate, the goal of this article is to examine the proliferation of corporate governance codes in the light of a single factor, namely varying corporate ownership structures across countries. While such codes emanated and became popular in the United Kingdom where companies largely display dispersed shareholding, the concept has been disseminated to countries that carry considerably different ownership structures, i.e. mainly concentrated shareholding. This is bound to give rise to incongruities in the implementation of these codes. In order to enunciate the claim made above, the article will consider two aspects that convergence advocates have focused on, namely (i) shareholder empowerment and (ii) self-regulation. For example, corporate governance codes place considerable emphasis on the structure and independence of the boards of directors of companies as a means to ensure shareholder protection. While this approach is meant to produce results in companies with dispersed shareholding, the same cannot be said of companies with concentrated shareholding where the empowerment of shareholders through director independence or other means would only embolden the already dominant controlling shareholders. Moving to self-regulation, a voluntary code operating on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis can ensure sufficient adherence only if certain factors are present in the jurisdiction where it is applied. Relying upon available empirical evidence, this article finds that use of self-regulation in voluntary codes of corporate governance may generate different results depending upon the ownership structures of companies, thereby exhibiting signs of divergence on this count.

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“…Pavyzdžiui, sutartinės bendrovės teorijos atstovai pripažįsta, kad visuomenės gerovės sąvoka yra labai plati, nes gerovė neišmatuojama skaičiais (ypač dėl nematerialių dalykų) [ [24]). 21 Vadovaujantis Kaldor-Hicks efektyvumo principu, sandoris ar sprendimas yra efektyvus, jei bendra nauda dėl tokio sandorio ar sprendimo yra didesnė nei bendri patirti nuostoliai [17, p. 15]. Pvz., jei dėl sandorio vienos šalies nuostolis yra -2, o kitos patirta nauda yra +3, sandoris yra efektyvus, nes bendra nauda yra +1.…”

Section: Akcininkų Interesų Pirmenybės Principo Ir Visuomenės Gerovėsunclassified

Sutartinė Bendrovės Teorija Ir Akcininkų Interesų Pirmenybės Principas

Lauraitytė¹

2014

LAW

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Vilniaus universiteto Teisės fakulteto Privatinės teisės katedros doktorantė Saulėtekio al. 9, I rūmai, LT-10222 Vilnius Tel. (+370 5) 236 61 70 El. paštas: egle.lauraityte@tf.vu.lt Straipsnyje analizuojamos bendrovių teisės doktrinoje dominuojančios sutartinės bendrovės teorijos tezės, įtvirtinančios akcininkų interesų pirmenybės principą. Taip pat aiškinamos sutartinės bendrovės teorijos, ją papildančios ekonominės atstovavimo teorijos ir akcininkų interesų pirmenybės principo sąsajos; analizuojami ir pagrindiniai sutartinės bendrovės teorijos argumentai, pagrindžiantys akcininkų interesų pirmenybės principą, ir šiam principui oponuojančios pozicijos ekonominės teisės analizės paradigmoje.The article analyses the shareholders primacy principle stated by the contractual theory of the corporation, a dominant theory of a corporate law scholarship. The article explains the links between contractual theory, the supplementing economic agency theory and shareholders primacy principle; it also discusses the main arguments supporting application of this principle as well as opposing views in the economic analysis of law paradigm.

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Corporate Boards in Europe—Accountability and Convergence

Cited by 46 publications

References 39 publications

Corporate Governance Codes: A Review and Research Agenda

Corporate Governance Codes: A Review and Research Agenda

Proliferation of corporate governance codes in the backdrop of divergent ownership structures

Sutartinė Bendrovės Teorija Ir Akcininkų Interesų Pirmenybės Principas

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