Abstract:Background: The recent literature frequently represents schizophrenia as a deteriorating neurocognitive process similar to organic degenerative dementia. Methods: This study addresses the following questions: (1) Did the classic authors equate degenerative dementia with schizophrenia? (2) Is there empirical evidence pointing to a close similarity between schizophrenia and organic dementia? (3) Does empirical evidence support the view that intellectual impairment and/or more specific neuropsychological dysfunct… Show more
“…More importantly, the negative symptoms are conceived of as quantitative deficits, fall-outs of normal functions (too little), which are signaled by the deprivative alpha: a-logia, a-volition, an-ergia, etc. This deficit view, however, has a limited resemblance to the clinical core of schizophrenia 15. Blankenburg25 evoked here an insightful and useful dictum: “the Minus (the deficit) in schizophrenia is caused by the Aliter (the different [strange]), whereas the reverse is true for the organic dementia.” Psychiatrists, trained today, have difficulty in indentifying and describing clinically significant formal thought disorder, disordered discourse, and varieties of disintegrated expressivity.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…The fundamental features—also emphasized by Kraepelin and others—were many: autism, formal thought disorder, ambivalence, affective-emotional, and affect-expressive changes, changes in the structure of the person, disorders of volition, acting and behavior, and the socalled “schizophrenic dementia” (which Bleuler did not conceived on the analogy with organic dementia 14,15). …”
This article traces the fundamental descriptive features of schizophrenia described in the European continental literature form Kraepelin and Bleuler, culminating with the creation of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)-8 (1974). There was a consensus among the researchers that the specificity and typicality of schizophrenia was anchored to its “fundamental” clinical core (with trait status) and not to positive psychotic features, which were considered as “state”, “accessory” phenomena. The clinical core of schizophrenia was, in a diluted form, constitutive of the spectrum conditions (“schizoidia” and “latent schizophrenia”). The fundamental features are manifest across all domains of consciousness: subjective experience, expression, cognition, affectivity, behavior, and willing. Yet, the specificity of the core was only graspable at a more comprehensive Gestalt-level, variously designated (eg, discordance, autism, “Spaltung”), and not on the level of single features. In other words, the phenomenological specificity was seen as being expressive of a fundamental structural or formal change of the patient’s mentality (consciousness, subjectivity). This overall change transpires through the single symptoms and signs, lending them a characteristic phenomenological pattern. This concept of schizophrenia bears little resemblance to the current operational definitions. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, and ICD-10 seem to diagnose a subset of patients with chronic paranoid-hallucinatory variant of schizophrenia.
“…More importantly, the negative symptoms are conceived of as quantitative deficits, fall-outs of normal functions (too little), which are signaled by the deprivative alpha: a-logia, a-volition, an-ergia, etc. This deficit view, however, has a limited resemblance to the clinical core of schizophrenia 15. Blankenburg25 evoked here an insightful and useful dictum: “the Minus (the deficit) in schizophrenia is caused by the Aliter (the different [strange]), whereas the reverse is true for the organic dementia.” Psychiatrists, trained today, have difficulty in indentifying and describing clinically significant formal thought disorder, disordered discourse, and varieties of disintegrated expressivity.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…The fundamental features—also emphasized by Kraepelin and others—were many: autism, formal thought disorder, ambivalence, affective-emotional, and affect-expressive changes, changes in the structure of the person, disorders of volition, acting and behavior, and the socalled “schizophrenic dementia” (which Bleuler did not conceived on the analogy with organic dementia 14,15). …”
This article traces the fundamental descriptive features of schizophrenia described in the European continental literature form Kraepelin and Bleuler, culminating with the creation of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)-8 (1974). There was a consensus among the researchers that the specificity and typicality of schizophrenia was anchored to its “fundamental” clinical core (with trait status) and not to positive psychotic features, which were considered as “state”, “accessory” phenomena. The clinical core of schizophrenia was, in a diluted form, constitutive of the spectrum conditions (“schizoidia” and “latent schizophrenia”). The fundamental features are manifest across all domains of consciousness: subjective experience, expression, cognition, affectivity, behavior, and willing. Yet, the specificity of the core was only graspable at a more comprehensive Gestalt-level, variously designated (eg, discordance, autism, “Spaltung”), and not on the level of single features. In other words, the phenomenological specificity was seen as being expressive of a fundamental structural or formal change of the patient’s mentality (consciousness, subjectivity). This overall change transpires through the single symptoms and signs, lending them a characteristic phenomenological pattern. This concept of schizophrenia bears little resemblance to the current operational definitions. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, and ICD-10 seem to diagnose a subset of patients with chronic paranoid-hallucinatory variant of schizophrenia.
“…Both are common in spoken language, but violate written language norms (all narratives were transcribed verbatim and printed as such to the evaluators). Consequently, spokenness characteristics may "naturally" have elicited contextual inappropriateness evaluations 1 . On the other hand, spoken-ness characteristics are particularly interpretation rich as MaClay and Osgood (1959) suggest in one of the first influential works on pauses and hesitation signals (such as "uhm"): "naturally-appearing pauses and other hesitation phenomena influence the listener's connotative judgments of the speaker, e.g.…”
Section: Aesteticsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…remains largely unanswered. This "whatness", the diagnostically defining and symptom-producing vulnerability trait or "core" of schizophrenia, is in recent continental-phenomenological psychiatry regarded as based not on cognitive deficits but on cognition used at the expense of pragmatics (1)(2)(3)(4). "Pragmatics" is primarily understood in the sense of what is contextually or socially appropriate.…”
Background: Recent continental-phenomenological psychiatry emphasizes pragmatics or social and contextual inappropriateness as a core disorder of schizophrenia, which is potentially relevant to early identification and treatment. Objective: However, there are hardly any studies that examine the background population's sensitivity to inappropriateness in schizophrenia, even if "common" people, from a pragmatic perspective, are likely to be highly sensitive to culturalconventional norms, including (in)appropriateness. Method: One empirical evaluation of contextual (in)appropriateness in 10 narratives from first-episode schizophrenia patients and healthy controls, respectively, found that when a phenomenologically informed Danish population (n=157 high-school students; mean age, 18.5) was "blinded" to the control-patient status -that is, "anonymous" narratives of the wordless picture story Frog, Where Are You? -they consequently evaluated patient narratives as more inappropriate than appropriate and control narratives as more appropriate than inappropriate (significant with 0.007). Aiming to explore a potential pattern recognition, distinguishing patient from control narratives, the present study systematizes and discusses salient explanations from lay "experts" who almost consequently (80% to 100%) evaluated patient narratives as inappropriate and control narratives as appropriate (n=63 of 157). Results: Explanations of inappropriateness concerned affective aspects (about how the patient felt or how the evaluators felt reading the narrative), formal aspects (about pauses, fluency, and brevity), and aspects about sense making (from lack of understanding to nonsense and strangeness).The background population may be sensitive to affective and formal inappropriateness, but only lay experts emphasize the lack of sense in the patients' narratives. Conclusion: Further studies might benefit from investigating whether early referrals from family, friends, or schoolteachers of their own accord thematize such inappropriateness aspects, and whether questionnaires targeting inappropriateness could be developed and used in the early identification of young people at risk.
“…It is viewed that what defines a mental illness is its effect on the conscious representational experience (Anscombe, 1987; Graham and Stephens, 2007). Moreover, schizophrenia is thought to involve a profound alteration in the structures (frameworks) of subjectivity (consciousness), and to manifest in self-relation and in the relation to the world (Urfer-Parnas et al, 2010). Furthermore, it is thought that schizophrenic patients lack control over mental processes so that when emotions and intuitions are not brought into focus, the individual loses his or her sense of self (Krabbendam and van Os, 2005).…”
Section: Explanation For the Remaining Features Of Schizophreniamentioning
The multiple etiologies of schizophrenia prompt us to raise the question: what final common pathway can induce a convincing sense of the reality of the hallucinations in this disease? The observation that artificial stimulation of an intermediate order of neurons of a normal nervous system induces hallucinations indicates that the lateral entry of activity (not resulting from canonical synaptic transmission) at intermediate neuronal orders may provide a mechanism for hallucinations. Meaningful hallucinations can be de-constructed into an organized temporal sequence of internal sensations of associatively learned items that occur in the absence of any external stimuli. We hypothesize that these hallucinations are autonomously generated by the re-activation of pathological non-specific functional LINKs formed between the postsynaptic membranes at certain neuronal orders and are examined as a final common mechanism capable of explaining most of the features of the disease. Reversible and stabilizable hemi-fusion between simultaneously activated adjacent postsynaptic membranes is viewed as one of the normal mechanisms for functional LINK formation and is dependent on lipid membrane composition. Methods of removing the proteins that may traverse the non-specifically hemi-fused membrane segments and attempts to replace the phospholipid side chains to convert the membrane composition to a near-normal state may offer therapeutic opportunities.
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