Cops and dobbers: A nodal cartography of onshore migration policing in New South Wales

Abstract

Most public and scholarly debate about immigration in Australia has focused on irregular arrivals of asylum seekers by sea and the harsh system of externalised border controls designed to deter and contain them. This paper concentrates on the operation of Australia’s internal borders. We present a critical account of onshore migration policing networks in the Australian state of New South Wales, which are conceptualised as a distinctive form of policing. Using the techniques of nodal cartography described by Johnston and Shearing (2003) we identify the institutions, mentalities and technologies driving the development of migration policing networks and discuss their structure and internal dynamics. We then examine the means by which chains of public and private actors are recruited to perform a migration policing role, drawing on Garland’s ideas about government-at-a-distance (Garland, 1997). We identify responsibilising strategies that capitalise on overlapping organisational interests, others that are underpinned by the threat of legal sanctions, and others that are directed towards changing the behaviour of unlawful non-citizens themselves. We conclude that the Australian state is not diminished by adopting a networked approach to onshore migration policing, but instead garners significant resources which it can then invest in the construction of a multi-faceted, structurally-embedded and potentially ubiquitous border.

Report and deport: Public vigilance and migration policing in Australia

“…The combination of raids, status checks, and cooperation with private actors amounts to an attrition-based strategy oriented toward producing a ‘ubiquitous’ border that is ‘structurally embedded’ within quotidian settings and interactions (Weber et al, 2013). Beyond facilitating detections, it is believed that ‘apply[ing] pressure to those who do not want to comply’ will compel self-deportation (ANAO, 2015: 25).…”

“…Through formal sanctions and financial inducements several governments have activated, inter alia, landlords, local police, employers, universities, security firms, and airlines as policing agents. This kaleidoscopic network of non-federal and market actors is legally or contractually obliged to undertake activities (monitoring, reporting, identity verification, service denials, arrest, detention) instrumental to legal control (Aliverti, 2015; Gilboy, 1997; Pham, 2008; Pratt, 2005; Walsh, 2014a; Weber et al, 2013). Consequently, the sovereign state is no longer the sole executor of territoriality, but one, albeit critical, actor in a patchwork of practitioners.…”

“…Whether in relation to the nature or scale of enrollment, public vigilance displays distinctive contours, rationalities, and consequences that deserve more considered attention. While existing studies have referenced immigration tip-lines as part of a broader effort to map contemporary policing networks (see Aliverti, 2015: 218–219; Pratt, 2005: 193–194; Walsh, 2014a: 246–247; Weber et al, 2013: 42), the following offers a more systematic elaboration. Despite its idiosyncrasies, the Australian case embodies global trends.…”

Enlisting the Public in the Policing of Immigration

“…In fiscal year 2012/3, of 14,598 enforcement operations conducted 3,413 of them originated from allegations made by members of the public and other sources. 3 While judged by these numbers efforts to enlist 'responsibilized private actors' (Weber et al, 2014) on migration policing have paid off, the immigration department has been harshly criticized by its watchdog and some parliamentarians for failing to act upon those allegations consistently and effectively. They claimed that in the last few years only a small proportion of these allegations (between 2 and 4 per cent) had led to enforcement action.…”