COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock

Tulkens, Henry

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2783684

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…3 See, e.g., Tulkens (2016), Weitzman (2017), andAghion et al (2019). 4 However, considering the public good characters (such as non-excludability and non-rivalry) and because there is not a supranational institution that can enforce the governments to internalize the externalities, bounding to an international environmental agreement, should be done by each country voluntarily, see Barrett, 2007and Nordhaus, 2021 environmental agreement.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Greenhouse gases mitigation: global externalities and short-termism

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Policies designed to control greenhouse gases imply domestic tradeoffs and international externalities, which lead to both domestic and international conflicts, influencing their feasibility and implementations. Our paper investigates two quantitative aspects within this debate. We intend to quantify the impact of: (a) the internalization of international externalities; and (b) the damage associated with a short-term view of climate policies. In this respect, we adopt the innovative (in this field) idea of model predictive control to formalize moving-horizon policy strategies and, thus, to build counterfactuals characterized by a different horizon for all policymakers.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Greenhouse gases mitigation: global externalities and short-termism

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…An effective solution requires an international emissions reduction agreement, which has proved extremely challenging to accomplish. Even the celebrated Paris Agreement that has taken 16 years of the UNFCC 1 has avoided negotiating each country's abatement (Tulkens, 2016;Weitzman, 2016). Instead, Article 3.1 of the UNFCC encourages leadership by stating that the "developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change."…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership and Climate Policy

Mideksa

2021

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines leadership in relation to supplying a global public good. Both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement encourage the developed countries to take a lead in reducing emissions. Does a country benefit from taking a lead? When does leadership improve global welfare? The answer depends on how transparent the leader's abatement technology is for the followers. When there is no transparency and the leader has to abate to signal the abatement cost, leadership reduces global welfare unless the crowding-out effect is weak. If there is transparency and the follower can benefit from technology spillover effects, leadership reduces global welfare unless the spillover effect is sufficiently large. I find that transparency reduces global welfare unless the spillover effect is sufficiently large and the difference in abatement cost is small. This theory can rationalize the European Union's stance on climate policy while also explaining the perceived failure of the Kyoto Protocol.

show abstract

“…See e.g., Silva (). In a similar vein, Tulkens () writes, “… the logical economic outcome at the world level of the ‘bottom up’ procedure of determining future emissions in terms of NDCs [NDCs = Nationally Determined Contributions; added by the authors] exactly corresponds to the concept of equilibrium with subscription first introduced by Malinvaud () (pp. 173–76; pp.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bottom‐up world climate policies: Preserving fossil fuel deposits vs. capping fuel consumption

Eichner

Pethig

2019

Canadian J of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The policy of purchasing fossil fuel deposits for preservation is an alternative to the demand-side climate policies that predominate in practice and in professional studies. This paper analyzes the deposit purchase approach and compares it to the standard demand-side policy in a model with international trade and non-cooperative governments that account for the effects of their policies on equilibrium prices. We investigate how the two regimes differ with respect to their equilibrium allocations and, in particular, with respect to the countries' mitigation effort and welfare. If countries are symmetric, mitigation is stronger in the demand-side than in the supply-side regime and the transition from the latter to the former is welfare enhancing for all countries. If countries have different endowments of deposits in a two-country economy, the country with higher extraction costs does not purchase deposits for preservation, and the country with lower extraction costs is better off with the supply-side than with the demand-side policy. Finally, we consider the case of combined policies and find surprisingly that no equilibrium in pure strategies exists, when heterogeneous countries apply both policy instruments.

show abstract

COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock

Cited by 4 publications

References 24 publications

Greenhouse gases mitigation: global externalities and short-termism

Greenhouse gases mitigation: global externalities and short-termism

Leadership and Climate Policy

Bottom‐up world climate policies: Preserving fossil fuel deposits vs. capping fuel consumption

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About