2022
DOI: 10.1002/mde.3538
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Coordination through revenue sharing contract in an E‐commerce supply chain with consumer preference

Abstract: The decision‐making and coordination of an e‐commerce supply chain (ECSC) with consumer preferences are studied. In this paper, the ECSC, consisting of a single manufacturer and a single e‐commerce platform, is considered, and the optimal decisions are made for two scenarios, namely, decentralized and centralized decision models. Then, a comparative analysis is performed for two models. The coordination mechanism of “revenue sharing” is proposed based on the decentralization, and finally, a numerical analysis … Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(5 citation statements)
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References 44 publications
(55 reference statements)
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“…According to Cai (2010), dual-channel supply chains are affected by channel structures. Liu et al (2022) find that ecommerce service quality is the highest under the decentralized decision model and point out that improving the e-commerce service level is not necessarily beneficial for the e-tailer.…”
Section: Dual-channel Strategies In E-commercementioning
confidence: 89%
“…According to Cai (2010), dual-channel supply chains are affected by channel structures. Liu et al (2022) find that ecommerce service quality is the highest under the decentralized decision model and point out that improving the e-commerce service level is not necessarily beneficial for the e-tailer.…”
Section: Dual-channel Strategies In E-commercementioning
confidence: 89%
“…The second related stream of literature is the coordination strategy for the FPSC. To eliminate the double marginal effect in the decentralized channel, coordination contracts are designed, such as the quantity discount contract (Plambeck & Taylor, 2005), the wholesale price contract (Xu & Bisi, 2012), the revenue‐sharing contract (Cachon & Lariviere, 2005; Liu et al, 2022; Liu & Liu, 2021; Xiao & Xu, 2013), and the cost‐sharing contract (Ghosh & Shah, 2015; He et al, 2020; Zhou et al, 2018). Based on these contracts, Cai et al (2010) consider the impact of product quality and freshness‐keeping effort and design an improved coordination contract for the FPSC.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The consumers' preference for self-run maintenance provided by the firm is denoted as the parameter α, which is also the proportion of consumers who choose the company's direct maintenance (Dan et al, 2018;Liu et al, 2022). The product failure rate is represented by the parameter r. The prices of the firm's and the third-party service provider's repair are p F and p T , respectively.…”
Section: The Demand Functionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To increase the core competitiveness of its services, the firm adopts the original part for both services while non‐original parts are used in the third‐party business. Based on the above analysis, the demand function of the firm and the third‐party service provider can be presented as follows: DFSgoodbreak=()1goodbreak−θ()agoodbreak−pitalicαrgoodbreak−pFgoodbreak+δpTgoodbreak+η()sFgoodbreak−δsT DTSgoodbreak=()1goodbreak−θ()agoodbreak−p()1goodbreak−αrgoodbreak−pTgoodbreak+δpFgoodbreak+η()sTgoodbreak−δsF The consumers' preference for self‐run maintenance provided by the firm is denoted as the parameter α, which is also the proportion of consumers who choose the company's direct maintenance (Dan et al, 2018; Liu et al, 2022). The product failure rate is represented by the parameter r.…”
Section: Problem Description and Model Setupmentioning
confidence: 99%