Coordination and competition in a common retailer channel: Wholesale price versus revenue-sharing mechanisms

Chakraborty, Tulika; Chauhan, Satyaveer Singh; Vidyarthi, Navneet

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.010

Cited by 93 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(57 reference statements)

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“…Thus, coordinating and aligning decisions among entities is of great importance. The most common coordination contracts in the literature include buyback (Donohue, 2000), revenue sharing (Xu et al 2014;Chakraborty et al 2015), quantity discounts , quantity flexibility (Tsay, 1999), etc. However the multi objective coordination of a supply chain by means of these contracts have not been considered yet.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi objective coordination of a supply chain with routing and service level consideration

Alaei

Setak

2015

International Journal of Production Economics

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi objective coordination of a supply chain with routing and service level consideration

Alaei

Setak

2015

International Journal of Production Economics

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“…El Ouardighi (2014) extended the revenue-sharing idea to collaboration of manufacturer and supplier to improve the quality of the product. Chakraborty et al (2015) studied comparing revenue-sharing contracts with wholesale price in common retailer channel and concluded that when common retailer has the lead role, it is beneficial for retailer to offer salvage revenue-sharing contract. When manufacturers are leaders, then it is beneficial for the manufacturers to provide wholesale price contract although revenue-sharing contract contributes to the channel performance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and inventory decisions in a vendor managed inventory system with revenue sharing contract

Haji¹,

Afzalabadi²,

Rasoul³

2018

10.5267/j.uscm

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In this paper, we design a revenue sharing contract to coordinate pricing and inventory control decisions in a serial supply chain consisting of one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. We assume that the retailer faces Poisson demand and his unsatisfied demands will be lost. The retailer applies one-for-one period policy in which he constantly places an order for one unit of product to the manufacturer in a predetermined time interval which results in a deterministic demand for the manufacturer. Solution procedures are developed to find the equilibrium in the Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) program with a revenue sharing contract, in which no party is willing to deviate from for the sake of maximizing his own profit. Furthermore, we formulate the total profit of the system and obtain the optimal retail price and order cycle for the retailer and the inventory policy of manufacturer which maximizes the supply chain's total profit and at the end we will highlight the revenue sharing contract performance.

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“…Chakraborty et al. () study the coordination and competition in a retail channel with wholesale price and revenue‐sharing mechanisms. Comparatively few researchers have studied the cooperating models between hotel and OTA.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal online channel strategies for a hotel considering direct booking and cooperation with an online travel agent

Yan

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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This paper studies the channel strategies for a hotel considering alternative online distribution channels. The decision for the hotel involves whether to rely on direct booking via its official website or cooperating with an online travel agent (OTA), and if the latter is suggested, what business model to be adopted for the cooperation with the OTA. Three mathematical models, i.e., direct booking model, OTA merchant model, and OTA agent model, are developed to evaluate the costs and benefits in the three different cases. The negotiation process in the OTA agent model is studied by using the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The optimal decisions and profits are analyzed with respect to the values of key parameters. Results of numerical examples are discussed to show the implications of the established models.

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Coordination and competition in a common retailer channel: Wholesale price versus revenue-sharing mechanisms

Cited by 93 publications

References 27 publications

Multi objective coordination of a supply chain with routing and service level consideration

Multi objective coordination of a supply chain with routing and service level consideration

Pricing and inventory decisions in a vendor managed inventory system with revenue sharing contract

Optimal online channel strategies for a hotel considering direct booking and cooperation with an online travel agent

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