Coordinating resources in Stackelberg Security Games

Bucarey, L Víctor; Casorrán, Carlos; Ordóñez, Fernando; Figueroa, Oscar

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.002

Cited by 14 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…With regard to solution methods, similar methods for solving GSGs can be applied to handle SSGs. Moreover, the practical applications of SSGs encompass wildlife protection [165], passenger screening at airports [166], crime prevention [167], cyber-security [168], information security [169], border patrol [170], [171], and so forth. In the meantime, there are other scenarios addressed in the literature, like multidefender cases [172], [173], Bayesian generalizations [174], and the case with bounded rationality [175] and ambiguous information [176], etc.…”

Section: B Stackelberg Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is an important task for a country to secure national borders to avoid illicit behaviors of drugs, contraband, and stowaway, etc. In this spirit, border patrols are introduced here as one application of SSGs, which is proposed by Carabineros de Chile [170], [171], to thwart drug trafficking, contraband and illegal entry. To this end, both day and night shift patrols along the border are arranged by Carabineros according to distinct requirements.…”

Section: Jammer Radar Rangementioning

confidence: 99%

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A Survey of Decision Making in Adversarial Games

Li¹,

Mao²,

Ye³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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Game theory has by now found numerous applications in various fields, including economics, industry, jurisprudence, and artificial intelligence, where each player only cares about its own interest in a noncooperative or cooperative manner, but without obvious malice to other players. However, in many practical applications, such as poker, chess, evader pursuing, drug interdiction, coast guard, cyber-security, and national defense, players often have apparently adversarial stances, that is, selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players. Along this line, this paper provides a systematic survey on three main game models widely employed in adversarial games, i.e., zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games, Stackelberg (security) games, zero-sum differential games, from an array of perspectives, including basic knowledge of game models, (approximate) equilibrium concepts, problem classifications, research frontiers, (approximate) optimal strategy seeking techniques, prevailing algorithms, and practical applications. Finally, promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.

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Section: B Stackelberg Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Jammer Radar Rangementioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Decision Making in Adversarial Games

Li¹,

Mao²,

Ye³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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“…A border defense problem [25], [26], where a pursuer captures an evader before the evader leaves the territory, is solved using game theory based on Apollonius circle. Security games [27]- [29] provide resource allocation-based solutions to defenders protecting the paths of agents. In the security games, a defender should be at-least in the vicinity of a static/dynamic agent (also called a target) for its protection.…”

Section: A Territory Protection Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Decentralized Multi-UAV Spatio-Temporal Multi-Task Allocation Approach for Perimeter Defense

Velhal¹,

Sundaram²,

Sundararajan³

2021

Preprint

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This paper provides a new solution approach to a multi-player perimeter defense game, in which the intruders' team tries to enter the territory, and a team of defenders protects the territory by capturing intruders on the perimeter of the territory. The objective of the defenders is to detect and capture the intruders before the intruders enter the territory. Each defender independently senses the intruder and computes his trajectory to capture the assigned intruders in a cooperative fashion. The intruder is estimated to reach a specific location on the perimeter at a specific time. Each intruder is viewed as a spatio-temporal task, and the defenders are assigned to execute these spatio-temporal tasks. At any given time, the perimeter defense problem is converted into a Decentralized Multi-UAV Spatio-Temporal Multi-Task Allocation (DMUST-MTA) problem. The cost of executing a task for a trajectory is defined by a composite cost function of both the spatial and temporal components. In this paper, a decentralized consensus-based bundle algorithm has been modified to solve the spatio-temporal multi-task allocation problem and the performance evaluation of the proposed approach is carried out based on Monte-Carlo simulations. The simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed approach to solve the perimeter defense game under different scenarios. Performance comparison with a stateof-the art centralized approach with full observability, clearly indicate that DMUST-MTA achieves similar performance in a decentralized way with partial observability conditions with a lesser computational time and easy scaling up.

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“…Although some studies have focused on generating an optimal patrol strategy to protect border security [12,13], the approach that addresses all of above factors simultaneously is still ignored. In addition, unlike the deployment of static resources in the existing border patrol research [14,15], there is an exponential increase in the number of strategies due to temporal and spatial constraints, which introduces huge computational challenges to the problem.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A multi-UAV deployment method for border patrolling based on Stackelberg game

Liu

Wang

et al. 2023

J. of Syst. Eng. Electron.

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To strengthen border patrol measures, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are gradually used in many countries to detect illegal entries on borders. However, how to efficiently deploy limited UAVs to patrol on borders of large areas remains challenging. In this paper, we first model the problem of deploying UAVs for border patrol as a Stackelberg game. Two players are considered in this game: The border patrol agency is the leader, who optimizes the patrol path of UAVs to detect the illegal immigrant. The illegal immigrant is the follower, who selects a certain area of the border to pass through at a certain time after observing the leader 's strategy. Second, a compact linear programming problem is proposed to tackle the exponential growth of the number of leader's strategies. Third, a method is proposed to reduce the size of the strategy space of the follower. Then, we provide some theoretic results to present the effect of parameters of the model on leader's utilities. Experimental results demonstrate the positive effect of limited starting and ending areas of UAV's patrolling conditions and multiple patrolling altitudes on the leader 's utility, and show that the proposed solution outperforms two conventional patrol strategies and has strong robustness.

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Coordinating resources in Stackelberg Security Games

Cited by 14 publications

References 22 publications

A Survey of Decision Making in Adversarial Games

A Survey of Decision Making in Adversarial Games

A Decentralized Multi-UAV Spatio-Temporal Multi-Task Allocation Approach for Perimeter Defense

A multi-UAV deployment method for border patrolling based on Stackelberg game

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