Coordinating farms in collective agri-environmental schemes: the role of conditional incentives

Limbach, Kristin; Rozan, Anne

doi:10.1093/erae/jbad032

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 45 publications

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“…In France for instance, agri-environmental schemes can be contracted by collective organizations such as pastoral groups or municipalities [ 120 ], while collective incentives (e.g. where farmers are only paid once a certain area coverage is collectively reached) are being implemented [ 121 ]. Since 2016, the Netherlands went a step further in institutionalising collective action by choosing to implement agri-environmental schemes through collective applications exclusively (mostly through Environmental Cooperatives) [ 112 , 119 , 122 ].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Navigating agricultural nonpoint source pollution governance: A social network analysis of best management practices in central Pennsylvania

Dingkuhn,

O’Sullivan,

Schulte

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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The Chesapeake Bay watershed is representative of governance challenges relating to agricultural nonpoint source pollution and, more generally, of sustainable resources governance in complex multi-actor settings. We assess information flows around Best Management Practices (BMPs) undertaken by dairy farmers in central Pennsylvania, a subregion of the watershed. We apply a mixed-method approach, combining Social Network Analysis, the analysis of BMP-messaging (i.e. information source, flow, and their influences), and qualitative content analysis of stakeholders’ interviews. Key strategic actors were identified through network centrality measures such as degree of node, betweenness centrality, and clustering coefficient. The perceived influence/credibility (by farmers) of BMP-messages and their source, allowed for the identification of strategic entry points for BMP-messages diffusion. Finally, the inductive coding process of stakeholders’ interviews revealed major hindrances and opportunities for BMPs adoption. We demonstrate how improved targeting of policy interventions for BMPs uptake may be achieved, by better distributing entry-points across stakeholders. Our results reveal governance gaps and opportunities, on which we draw to provide insights for better tailored policy interventions. We propose strategies to optimize the coverage of policy mixes and the dissemination of BMP-messages by building on network diversity and actors’ complementarities, and by targeting intervention towards specific BMPs and actors. We suggest that (i) conservation incentives could target supply chain actors as conservation intermediaries; (ii) compliance-control of manure management planning could be conducted by accredited private certifiers; (iii) policy should focus on incentivizing inter-farmers interaction (e.g. farmers’ mobility, training, knowledge-exchange, and engagement in multi-stakeholders collaboration) via financial or non-pecuniary compensation; (iv) collective incentives could help better coordinate conservation efforts at the landscape or (sub-)watershed scale; (v) all relevant stakeholders (including farmers) should be concerted and included in the discussion, proposition, co-design and decision process of policy, in order to take their respective interests and responsibilities into account.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Navigating agricultural nonpoint source pollution governance: A social network analysis of best management practices in central Pennsylvania

Dingkuhn,

O’Sullivan,

Schulte

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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Can collective conditionality improve agri-environmental contracts? From lab to field experiments

Limbach,

Rozan,

Le Coent

et al. 2023

Rev Agric Food Environ Stud

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Individual subsidy payments that are conditional on a collective contribution threshold could provide a viable resolution to the insufficient and dispersed adoption of agri-environmental contracts aiming at attaining environmental quality targets. Indeed, in a decontextualized laboratory experiment based on a threshold public good game (TPGG), Le Coent et al. (2014) offer promising results regarding a conditional subsidy compared to an unconditional subsidy (i.e. the standard subsidy in existing agrienvironmental schemes). In this article, we propose to improve the external validity of these results by transposing this laboratory experiment to the "field" with farmers. To do so, we carry out a contextualized lab-in-field experiment with farmers by explicitly mentioning agri-environmental contracts and water quality. Our results show that farmers cooperate even more successfully than students and sustain more efficient outcomes over time. Considering a between-subject, both in the lab with students, and in the "lab-in-field" experiment with farmers, our results indicate that average group contributions are not significantly different under the conditional subsidy mechanism and under the unconditional subsidy mechanism. Indeed the conditional subsidy introduces two behavioural responses (perceived risks and initial beliefs on others' contributions) having opposite effects on contributions, and compensating each other. The conditional incentive mechanism thus shows promising potential as a tool for agri-environmental policy since it avoids the pay-for-nothing trap of the unconditional subsidy mechanism without discouraging contributions.

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Spatially coordinated conservation auctions: A framed field experiment focusing on farmland wildlife conservation in China

Liu,

Banerjee,

Cason

et al. 2024

American J Agri Economics

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How best to incentivize land managers to achieve conservation goals in an economically and ecologically effective manner is a key policy question that has gained increased relevance from the setting of ambitious new global targets for biodiversity conservation. Conservation (reverse) auctions are a policy tool for improving the environmental performance of agriculture, which has become well‐established in the academic literature and in policy making in the US and Australia. However, little is known about the likely response of farmers to incentives within such an auction to (1) increase spatial connectivity and (2) encourage collective participation. This paper presents the first framed field experiment with farmers as participants that examines the effects of two features of conservation policy design: joint (collective) participation by farmers and the incentivization of spatial connectivity. The experiment employs farmers in China, a country making increasing use of payments for ecosystem services to achieve a range of environmental objectives. We investigate whether auction performance—both economic and ecological—can be improved by the introduction of agglomeration bonus and joint bidding bonus mechanisms. Our empirical results suggest that, compared to a baseline spatially coordinated conservation auction, the performance of an auction with an agglomeration bonus, a joint bidding bonus, or both, is inferior on two key metrics—the environmental benefits generated and cost effectiveness realized.

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Coordinating farms in collective agri-environmental schemes: the role of conditional incentives

Cited by 3 publications

References 45 publications

Navigating agricultural nonpoint source pollution governance: A social network analysis of best management practices in central Pennsylvania

Navigating agricultural nonpoint source pollution governance: A social network analysis of best management practices in central Pennsylvania

Can collective conditionality improve agri-environmental contracts? From lab to field experiments

Spatially coordinated conservation auctions: A framed field experiment focusing on farmland wildlife conservation in China

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