Coordinating contracts for a financially constrained supply chain

Self Cite

This study investigates a co-opetition-type dual-channel supply chain that consists of a competitive supplier (CS) and a capital-constrained manufacturer (CCM). The CCM procures key components from and simultaneously competes with the CS in the consumer market. To address the CCM's capital constraint, we consider three financing strategies, namely, trade credit, bank loan, and hybrid financing (i.e., combined use of bank loan and equity financing). Game models are established to characterize the interactions between the CS and CCM. The corresponding equilibria are derived under each strategy. Then, comparative analyses are conducted, and the CS's and CCM's preference structures regarding the three strategies are revealed. On this basis, the equilibrium strategy can be concluded as either trade credit or hybrid financing, but never bank loan. Specifically, when the equity financing ratio is small or large, trade credit is an equilibrium strategy. When the equity financing ratio is medium, the equilibrium strategy between trade credit and hybrid financing is determined by consumers' product preference and loan interest rate.accounted for a combined shipping volume of over 533 million units in 2017. This value is equivalent to 36.3% of the global smartphone market. 2 Although the two companies are in fierce competition in their industry, they cooperate with each other in many areas. 3 Notably, Samsung has provided Apple with processors and OLED screens for many years. 4 Such "co-opetition" is prevalent in many high-technology industries. Other typical examples are IBM and Cisco. The former purchases network equipment from the latter, while simultaneously competing in the overall server market. 5 The dual-channel supply chain, in which a supplier provides a manufacturer with key components while the two companies compete with each other in the final market, is common in real businesses. However, in practice, certain manufacturers in such dual-channel supply chains may lack capital to support production. For example, the smartphone screens used by Gionee, a well-known smartphone manufacturer in China, have always been provided by Foxconn. However, in recent years, Gionee has encountered capital-shortage problems and sought financing instruments to support its production. Consequently, one of the critical challenges for Gionee is selecting a suitable financing strategy.Accordingly, we extend the current literature by examining a co-opetition-type dual-channel supply chain, which consists of a competitive supplier (CS) and a capital-constrained manufacturer (CCM). The two firms are cooperative in component supply but competitive in the consumer market. Specifically, the CCM procures components from the CS. Meanwhile, the two companies compete by selling substitutable products in the same consumer market. For the capital constraint of the CCM, we consider three financing strategies. In Strategy 1 (trade credit), the CS offers trade credit to the CCM. In Strategy 2 (bank loan), the CCM seeks a bank loan to support its ...

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financing strategies for a capital‐constrained manufacturer in a dual‐channel supply chain

Xiao

2019

Self Cite

“…Other works regarding bankruptcy costs can be found in Chod () and Xiao et al. (). On a different note from the existing literature, this paper develops a model that includes the bankruptcy costs in the context of borrowing under the supplier's guarantee.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The assumptions about the interest rate of bank loan and opportunity cost of capital follow the existing literature, such as Kouvelis and Zhao (, , ), Xiao et al. (), Tunca and Zhu (), Yang and Birge (), Hua et al. (), and Jin et al.…”

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The supplier's optimal guarantee policy in newsvendor finance

Jiang

2019

The retailer is a capital-constrained newsvendor and can borrow money from the bank if necessary. To help the retailer get a bank loan at a lower interest rate, the supplier provides guarantee for the retailer's loan up to a prespecified amount. In a Stackelberg game, the supplier decides the wholesale price and the guarantee amount as a leader, and then the retailer determines the order quantity and the amount of the loan as a follower. The supplier is risk-neutral while the retailer's risk preference is reflected by a spectral risk measure (risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking). For a given wholesale price and guarantee amount, the retailer's objective function is quasi-concave in the order quantity. The optimal solutions for the supplier and the retailer are derived. The supplier's expected profit with optimized wholesale price increases with the guarantee amount, and thus the supplier's optimal policy is to provide a full guarantee for the retailer's loan. When the supplier can limit his guarantee responsibility by a proportion of the outstanding loan obligation, the supplier's optimal policy is also to provide a full guarantee. Even if the retailer incurs bankruptcy costs in the event of repayment default, the supplier's optimal guarantee policy remains the same in these two different forms of limited guarantee. However, when the wholesale price is exogenous, that is, not a decision variable, the full guarantee is not necessarily optimal for supplier.

“…Xiao et al. () investigate three supply chain contracts in a financially constrained supply chain and find that the generalized revenue‐sharing contract can coordinate this type of supply chain. Moreover, some studies take credit rating into account to investigate supply chain finance problems.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints

Cao

et al. 2018

Carbon tax policy is widely adopted by many countries to curb carbon emissions. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms have more incentive to improve carbon reduction levels by reducing their carbon tax costs. However, firms need to bear carbon reduction costs that may cause shortage of capital. Thus, firms may face problems of financial constraints, which may demotivate firms to produce greener products. To address the decision-making challenges of firms in the contexts of carbon tax policy and financial constraints, we consider a supply chain with a manufacturer who produces green products and a retailer who sells these products. Our study develops five models to investigate the two firms' optimal wholesale price, carbon reduction level and ordering quantity, according to the manufacturer and retailer with or without financial constraints. Our goal in this study is to explore how carbon tax policy and banks' interest rates affect the profits of the two firms, supply chain and consumer surplus. Certain managerial insights are obtained as follows. We demonstrate that carbon tax policy and banks' interest rates demotivate the manufacturer to produce greener products and demotivate the retailer to order more products. If the interest rate to the manufacturer (retailer) is relatively low, then the manufacturer with financial constraint benefits (harms) the consumers compared with the retailer with financial constraint. Importantly, our analysis suggests that carbon tax policy harms the firms but benefits consumers, and the government in some conditions should reduce unit carbon tax.