Coopetition Strategy and Pricing Timing in an Outsourcing Supply Chain With Uncertain Operation Risks

Chen, Huiru; Yan, Yingchen; Ma, Nana; Lu, Yang

doi:10.1109/tfuzz.2018.2821106

Cited by 22 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Two market environments: the ODM market and the OEM market are considered. Chen et al [4] studied three pricing sequences between an OEM and an ODM considering the operational risks. Liu and Ke [12] considered the pricing sequences when the manufacturer operates two channels via an e-commerce platform and explored the optimal pricing timing under different power structures.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on the complexity of channel pricing game in showrooming O2O supply chain

Liu

2022

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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An O2O supply chain consisting of a manufacturer with online direct channel and a retailer who resells through a brick-and-mortar store is considered. Three channel power structures (vertical Nash, manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg) and three pricing sequences (simultaneous pricing, manufacturer pricing early, retailer pricing early) are considered. Counter-intuitively, under the manufacturer Stackelberg structure, the retailer has a first-mover advantage and retailer-pricing-early achieves Pareto optimality. In the other cases, the manufacturer and the retailer have a late-mover advantage. Under the vertical Nash structure, both parties may get into prisoner’s dilemma. Extending the basic model to dynamic pricing, we found that the first mover of sequential pricing has better stability. The retailer Stackelberg structure has better stability than the vertical Nash structure and the manufacturer Stackelberg is the most unstable power structure. To avoid the negative impact of equilibrium price instability, the vertical and horizontal price matching mechanisms are proposed and the effectiveness in improving stability is proved.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on the complexity of channel pricing game in showrooming O2O supply chain

Liu

2022

RAIRO-Oper. Res.

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“…[34] investigated the impacts of private risk aversion magnitude and moral hazard when the risk aversion degree and the project variability are characterised as uncertain variables. [35] considered the external demand and the product substitution rate as uncertain variables and explored how cooperation decisions would affect preferred pricing timing. [36] analyzed a typical water-railroad (WRR) intermodal transportation that was composed of three serial transportation stages: water, rail and road, and formulated an uncertain bi-level programming model for the incentive contract design problem under expectation and entropy decision criteria.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality Management by Warranty Contract Under Dual Asymmetric Information

Chen

Lan

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Eng. Manage.

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“…Proof. Substituting E * � (q * e , q * d ) into equation (7), the Jacobian matrix at E * can be written as…”

Section: Proposition 1 Whenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ray Noorda (former CEO of Novell) first proposed "coopetition" to describe the simultaneous pursuit of cooperation and competition by companies, and later this term it was widely quoted by management scholars and managers (e.g., [4][5][6][7]). In coopetition supply chains, firms simultaneously compete and cooperate in order to maximize their profits [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yuan and Hwarng [22] investigated the demand dynamics, under a demandbased pricing policy, of a frequently purchased service with considerations of social interaction and customers' adaptively forward-looking behavior. Some studies (e.g., [7,23,24]) examined the impact of nonlinear cost on dynamic Cournot oligopoly game under boundedly rational expectation. Overall, the players' interaction and competition play a significant role in a supply chain.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Analysis of Dynamic Cournot Game in a Coopetition Supply Chain

Mai

Zhang

Sun

2020

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

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In the original manufacturing industry, upstream encroachment has become a universal commercial phenomenon. This paper considers a coopetition supply chain consisting of an upstream original design manufacturer (ODM) and a downstream original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and proposes a dynamic Cournot game under bounded rationality. To cope with a dynamic repeated game in discrete time, a gradient adjustment mechanism is adopted. Furthermore, bifurcation diagram, largest Lyapunov exponent, basin of attraction, and critical curve are introduced to investigate the dynamic behavior of this game. The results obtained show that as the firms’ policy adjustment speeds increase, the stability region of the dynamic system gradually narrows, but one special finding is that the complex behavior of the dynamic system is alleviated as the OEM’s adjustment speed greatly increases. Moreover, when the difference between the two firms’ adjustment speeds is relatively small, the dynamic adjustment strategy is beneficial to the coopetition supply chain and both firms under certain adjustment speeds, as compared to a one-shot game. In addition, a higher product substitutability has a positive impact on the system stability, pushing the “cooperation” business alliance towards a more coordinated outcome.

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Coopetition Strategy and Pricing Timing in an Outsourcing Supply Chain With Uncertain Operation Risks

Cited by 22 publications

References 41 publications

Study on the complexity of channel pricing game in showrooming O2O supply chain

Study on the complexity of channel pricing game in showrooming O2O supply chain

Quality Management by Warranty Contract Under Dual Asymmetric Information

Analysis of Dynamic Cournot Game in a Coopetition Supply Chain

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