Credit unions compete directly with for-profit commercial banks in markets for consumer financial services yet receive an exemption from federal corporate income tax. Commercial banks claim that credit unions are no different than for-profit banks and that the credit union tax exemption represents an unfair competitive advantage. Credit unions counter that while they offer similar products and services, they differ from commercial banks in terms of structure and mission, given their not-for-profit, cooperative status. In this paper, we test for substantive differences in the objective functions of for-profit commercial banks and nonprofit credit unions by comparing CEO compensation structures. We use a stylized principal-agent model and provide several arguments to support the hypotheses that credit union boards of directors establish lower-powered incentive contracts with their CEOs relative to similarly-sized commercial banks, and lower overall expected compensation. We find that bank CEOs receive approximately two-and-a-half times more performance-based compensation relative to credit union CEOs. Bank CEOs also earn approximately 10% to 20% more total compensation on average, depending on the measure. The results are generally robust to controlling for CEO characteristics (gender, tenure and retirement income), institution-level variables (e.g., asset size, growth, earnings, risk, complexity and market share), and local economic conditions (house price index and unemployment). The findings suggest important differences in incentive structures and objectives between banks and credit unions and serve as a foundation for further research.