Cooperative overlay routing in a multiple overlay environment

Cui, Ziteng; Liao, Jianxin; Wang, Jingyu; Qi, Qi; Wang, Jing

doi:10.1109/icc.2014.6883797

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Cooperative game theory can be applied as an alternative way to overcome the inefficiency of NE. Jiang et al [6] and Cui et al [10] adopted a Nash bargaining theory to improve the inefficiency of NE. However, Nash bargaining can only be applied to the game with two players.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Researchers in [3]- [7] focused on the interaction between overlay routing and TE in the single overlay scenario without studying the scenario of multiple overlays, and researchers in [8]- [12] focused on the interaction among co-existing overlays without considering the effect of TE. Secondly, we are the first to propose a cooperative coalition approach based on Shapley value to solve the efficiency loss in the hybrid interaction, which generalizes the Nash bargaining solution in [6] and [10].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Conflicts in Overlay Environments: Inefficient Equilibrium and Incentive Mechanism

Liao¹,

Gong²,

Jiang³

et al. 2016

KSII TIIS

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Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between each overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as the interaction among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze these interactions, which are collectively called hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, in which overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for this game. Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, in which TE is the leader and co-existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, in which players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. Finally, we apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to calculate the values for NE, SNE and the assigned cost for each player in each coalition, respectively. Analytical results are confirmed by the simulation on complex network topologies.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflicts in Overlay Environments: Inefficient Equilibrium and Incentive Mechanism

Liao¹,

Gong²,

Jiang³

et al. 2016

KSII TIIS

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“…A coalitional game model is also applied for the revenue allocation. Our previous work in [36] proposes a cooperative overlay routing method. By taking into consideration the fairness between co-existing overlays, a Nash bargaining solution is proposed to achieve a near optimal performance of the network.…”

Section: The Cooperative Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A coalitional game approach on improving interactions in multiple overlay environments

et al. 2015

Self Cite

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“…Cooperative game theory can be applied as an alternative way to overcome the inefficiency of NE. Jiang et al [5] and Cui et al [9] adopted a Nash bargaining theory to improve the inefficiency of NE. However, Nash bargaining can only be applied to the game with two players.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Assume that TE first chooses its routing strategy as the leader, and then all overlays determine their strategies The problem of the 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game can be described as: (9) This optimization problem is classified as bi-level programming (BP) problem [20]. In this Stackelberg-Nash game, all overlays are of equal status.…”

Section: A Stackelberg-nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive equilibrium and stable coalition in overlay environments

Jiang

Liao

Gong

et al. 2015

2015 IEEE 40th Conference on Local Computer Networks (LCN)

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Abstract-Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt game theoretic approaches to analyze this hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, where overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE). Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leadern-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, where TE is the leader and coexisting overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, where players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions.

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Cooperative overlay routing in a multiple overlay environment

Cited by 8 publications

References 16 publications

Conflicts in Overlay Environments: Inefficient Equilibrium and Incentive Mechanism

Conflicts in Overlay Environments: Inefficient Equilibrium and Incentive Mechanism

A coalitional game approach on improving interactions in multiple overlay environments

Competitive equilibrium and stable coalition in overlay environments

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