Cooperative Game Theory for Transboundary River Basins: The Syr Darya Basin

McKinney, Daene C.; Teasley, Rebecca

doi:10.1061/40927(243)221

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Many applications of non-cooperative games are known from the literature, which can be found in many text books, like [15]. The applications of cooperative games also cover a huge and diverse field in applied sciences, including natural resource management [16,17], power systems [18], waste management [19], transportation [20,21], insurance industry [22], social network analysis [23], communication network [24], manufacturing systems [25], pattern clustering [26], and business and economics [27], among others. In this paper, n-person oligopolies without product differentiation will be considered and examined under the assumption that the firms know the unit price function and are able to obtain information about the industry output; however, they do not know the cost functions of the others since no technology information is shared among the players.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Cooperative Oligopolies

Szidarovszky,

Matsumoto

2024

Mathematics

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An n-person cooperative oligopoly is considered without product differentiation. It is assumed that the firms know the unit price function but have no access to the cost functions of the competitors. From market data, they have information about the industry output. The firms want to find the output levels that guarantee maximum industry profit. First, the existence of a unique maximizer is proven, which the firms cannot determine directly because of the lack of the knowledge of the cost functions. Instead, a dynamic model is constructed, which is asymptotically stable under realistic conditions, and the state trajectories converge to the optimum output levels of the firms. Three models are constructed: first, no time delay is assumed; second, information delay is considered for the firms on the industry output; and third, in addition, information delay is also assumed about the firms’ own output levels. The stability of the resulting no-delay, one-delay, and two-delay dynamics is examined.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Cooperative Oligopolies

Szidarovszky,

Matsumoto

2024

Mathematics

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“…One of the representative methods of cooperative game theory is Shapley value method. McKinney and Teasley [20] applied Shapley value to seek a possible cooperation strategy among three riparian countries for sharing transboundary river water resources. Zima-Bockarjova et al [21] proposed a collaboration method of wind and hydro power, based on Shapley value, for splitting the extra value caused by bidding and operation strategy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incremental Benefit Allocation for Joint Operation of Multi-Stakeholder Wind-PV-Hydro Complementary Generation System With Cascade Hydro-Power: An Aumann-Shapley Value Method

et al. 2020

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In order to ensure joint operation of wind-PV-hydro complementary generation system with cascade hydro-power owned by multiple stakeholders, an equitable and efficient allocating mechanism for incremental benefit is of great importance. Firstly, the incremental benefit from joint operation is quantified for wind-PV-hydro complementary generation system with cascade hydro-power owned by multiple stakeholders in this paper. Then, different allocation methods such as proportional method, marginal benefits method, last addition method, Shapley value method, and Aumann-Shapley value method are applied to allocate the incremental benefit for each stakeholder. Next, a 4-stakeholder wind-PV-hydro complementary generation test system is employed to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of the presented different allocation methods and a 9-stakeholder wind-PV-hydro complementary generation test system is used to verify that Aumann-Shapley value method can reduce computational burden with regard to the participation of large number of stakeholders compared with traditional cooperative game-based method such as Shapley value method. INDEX TERMS Incremental benefit allocation, wind-PV-hydro complementary generation, cascade hydropower, multiple stakeholders, Aumann-Shapley value. NOMENCLATURE A. SETS Allocation result of stakeholder n under Shapley value method. π wd,i,t,k Marginal benefit of k-th segment of wind resource of wind generator i during period t. π pv,i,t,k Marginal benefit of k-th segment of solar resource of PV module i during period t. π Q,i,t,k Marginal benefit of k-th segment of water discharge resource of hydro generator i during period t. π V ,i,t,k Marginal benefit of k-th segment of reservoir resource of hydro generator i during period t.

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Pricing and Water Resource Allocation Scheme for the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China

Chen

Wang

2013

Water Resour Manage

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Cooperative Game Theory for Transboundary River Basins: The Syr Darya Basin

Cited by 8 publications

References 3 publications

Dynamic Cooperative Oligopolies

Dynamic Cooperative Oligopolies

Incremental Benefit Allocation for Joint Operation of Multi-Stakeholder Wind-PV-Hydro Complementary Generation System With Cascade Hydro-Power: An Aumann-Shapley Value Method

Pricing and Water Resource Allocation Scheme for the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China

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