Cooperative Enhancement Of Reproductive Success in Tropical Wren Societies

Rabenold, Kerry N.

doi:10.2307/1938061

Cited by 124 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 21 publications

(66 reference statements)

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“…Public goods games are common in biology at all levels of organization, from the capture and sharing of large preys by groups of predators (Packer et al 1990;Stander 1991;Creel 1997;Bednarz 1988) and cooperative nesting and breeding in birds (Rabenold 1984) The problem with the production of public goods (Olson 1965) is that, if contributing is costly, volunteers have a lower fitness than individuals that do not contribute; therefore an individual would rather avoid the cost of volunteering and exploit the public goods produced by others; someone must volunteer, however, otherwise the public good is not produced and everybody pays a cost higher than that of volunteering. Hence the social dilemma (Dawes 1980), which leads to the celebrated "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968).…”

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confidence: 99%

Coexistence of Cooperation and Defection in Public Goods Games

Archetti¹,

2010

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The production of public goods by the contribution of individual volunteers is a social dilemma because an individual that does not volunteer can benefit from the public good produced by the contributions of others. Therefore it is generally believed that public goods can be produced only in the presence of repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment) or relatedness (kin selection). Cooperation, however, often occurs in the absence of iterations and relatedness. We show that when the production of a public good is a Volunteer's Dilemma, in which a fixed number of cooperators is necessary to produce the public good, cooperators and defectors persist in a mixed equilibrium, without iterations and without relatedness. The production of a public good that depends on the costly contribution of a number of individuals is a social dilemma because everybody relies on someone else. Imagine a group of individuals witnessing a crime: each can volunteer to pay a small contribution to call the police; if nobody volunteers everybody pays a higher cost because the criminal remains at large. Clearly it is better to volunteer if nobody else does it, but everybody prefers that it is someone else who pays the contribution. The dilemma is that, if the decision is simultaneous, it can happen that one volunteers in vain, or that nobody volunteers because everybody thinks that someone else is doing it. A similar dilemma occurs in animal groups, for example when individuals must decide whether to raise the alarm against a predator.Other situations require more than one volunteer to produce the public good. Public goods games are common in biology at all levels of organization, from the capture and sharing of large preys by groups of predators (Packer et al. 1990;Stander 1991;Creel 1997;Bednarz 1988) and cooperative nesting and breeding in birds (Rabenold 1984) The problem with the production of public goods (Olson 1965) is that, if contributing is costly, volunteers have a lower fitness than individuals that do not contribute; therefore an individual would rather avoid the cost of volunteering and exploit the public goods produced by others; someone must volunteer, however, otherwise the public good is not produced and everybody pays a cost higher than that of volunteering. Hence the social dilemma (Dawes 1980), which leads to the celebrated "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968).In evolutionary biology it is generally believed (Rankin et al. 2007) that cooperation in public goods games is only possible in the presence of some form of assortment, which can be due to repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) or relatedness (kin selection; Hamilton 1964). Our scope here is to show that, instead, assortment is necessary only if the public good is modeled as an N-person Prisoner's Dilemma (NPD).It seems such common wisdom in the evolutionary biology literature to equate public goods games with the NPD, that in most papers the two ...

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confidence: 99%

Coexistence of Cooperation and Defection in Public Goods Games

Archetti¹,

2010

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“…It is interesting that sigmoid inputoutput functions are not limited to interactions between cells and molecules [e.g. : Chuang et al 2010, Cornforth et al 2012, Karey & Sirbasku 1988Jourdan et al 1995, Archetti et al 2015], but have been described for behavioural interactions in animal societies, where the benefit of social interactions in a group are often non-linear (in some cases sigmoid) functions of the number of cooperative members [Rabenold 1984, Bednarz 1988, Packer et al 1990, Stander 1991, Creel 1997, Yip et al 2008]. While our argument was essentially about enzyme kinetics, and therefore we have assume that the individual players are individual cells and the population is a population !…”

Section: Importance Of the Hill Equationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of optimal Hill coefficients in nonlinear public goods games

Archetti

Scheuring

2016

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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In evolutionary game theory, the effect of public goods like diffusible molecules has been modelled using linear, concave, sigmoid and step functions. The observation that biological systems are often sigmoid input-output functions, as described by the Hill equation, suggests that a sigmoid function is more realistic. The Michaelis-Menten model of enzyme kinetics, however, predicts a concave function, and while mechanistic explanations of sigmoid kinetics exist, we lack an adaptive explanation: what is the evolutionary advantage of a sigmoid benefit function? We analyse public goods games in which the shape of the benefit function can evolve, in order to determine the optimal and evolutionarily stable Hill coefficients. We find that, while the dynamics depends on whether output is controlled at the level of the individual or the population, intermediate or high Hill coefficients often evolve, leading to sigmoid input-output functions that for some parameters are so steep to resemble a step function (an on-off switch). Our results suggest that, even when the shape of the benefit function is unknown, models of biological public goods should be modelled using a sigmoid or step function rather than a linear or concave function.

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“…Roosting and raising of young takes place in grass or stick nests 2 m to 10 m above the ground in leguminous trees or in palms; grass nests are built by the wrens themselves, whereas stick nests are usurped from the Plain-fronted Thombird {Pha-cellodomus rufifrons) that builds them. There is a strong positive correlation between the size of a group and its reproductive success, probably because additional helpers defend the nest from predators (Rabenold 1984). In addition, larger groups are more likely to attempt second or even third broods (Rabenold 1984).…”

Section: Behavioral Ecology Of the Stripe-backed Wrenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is a strong positive correlation between the size of a group and its reproductive success, probably because additional helpers defend the nest from predators (Rabenold 1984). In addition, larger groups are more likely to attempt second or even third broods (Rabenold 1984). The mating system is polyandrous in groups that contain one or more subordinate males unrelated to the dominant female (termed "DF-stepsons") but monogamous in groups containing only those that are sons of the dominant female (termed "DFsons") because of a strong tendency of incest avoidance in this species (Piper and Slater 1993).…”

Section: Behavioral Ecology Of the Stripe-backed Wrenmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Courtship, Copulation, Nesting Behavior and Brood Parasitism in the Venezuelan Stripe-Backed Wren

Piper¹

1994

The Condor

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Abstract. Here I report the results of intensive observations of breeding behavior in the Stripe-backed Wren Campylorhynchus nuchalis of Venezuela, a polyandrous cooperative breeder. The breeding season in this species begins soon after the first rainfall of the wet season, and its onset is marked by conspicuous courtship of the dominant female by the dominant male and by subordinate males that are not sons of the dominant female. Copulations, of which an estimated nine occur per breeding attempt, take place in plain view and throughout the day but not in close temporal association with courtship. The amount of food provided to nestlings varies greatly among adult group members but is not correlated either to their relatedness to the young or their dominance status. Stripe-backed Wrens defend their nests vigorously, chasing dozens of species away including predators, nest competitors and the Shiny Cowbird, which parasitized at least 16% of nests surveyed in 1990 and 1991 and which appears to reduce severely the reproductive success of large and small groups alike.Key words: Campylorhynchus nuchahs; cooperative breeding; courtship; copulation; brood parasitism.Resumen. Aqui presento los resultados de observaciones intensas del comportamiento reproductivo del Cucarachero Chocorocoy Campylorhynchus nuchalis de Venezuela, un reproductor poliándrico y cooperativo. La estación reproductiva de esta especie comienza poco después de la primeras lluvias de la época lluviosa, y su comienzo es marcado por el cortejo conspicuo hacia la hembra dominante por el macho dominante y por machos subordinados que no son hijos de la hembra dominante. Las copulaciones, de las cuales se estima que ocurren nueve por intento de apareo, acontecen a plena vista y durante todo el dia, pero nunca en proximidad temporal con el cortejo. La cantidad de alimento proveído a los pichones varia grandemente entre los adultos de cada grupo, pero no está correlacionada ni con parentesco, ni con nivel de dominancia. Los cucaracheros defienden sus nidos vigorosamente, persiguiendo a dozenas de especies inclusive depredadores, competidores, y a los Tordos Mirlos Molothrus bonariensis, aves que parasitizan por lo menos el 16% de los nidos vistos en 1990 y 1991, y las cuales parecen reducir severamente el éxito reproductivo de grupos grandes y pequeños por igual.

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Cooperative Enhancement Of Reproductive Success in Tropical Wren Societies

Cited by 124 publications

References 21 publications

Coexistence of Cooperation and Defection in Public Goods Games

Coexistence of Cooperation and Defection in Public Goods Games

Evolution of optimal Hill coefficients in nonlinear public goods games

Courtship, Copulation, Nesting Behavior and Brood Parasitism in the Venezuelan Stripe-Backed Wren

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