Cooperative behavior in a model of evolutionary snowdrift games with N-person interactions

Zheng, Dafang; Yin, Haiping; Chan, Chun-Him; Hui, P. M.

doi:10.1209/0295-5075/80/18002

Cited by 108 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Zheng et al [88] studied an N-person Snowdrift game with cost sharing among contributors. They showed that cooperators can be maintained in the population at a small frequency (approximately 1/n with large n).…”

Section: (I) Homogeneous Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

113

133

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One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences: evidence from primates and humans'. I review the theoretical and experimental literature on the collective action problem in groups whose members differ in various characteristics affecting individual costs, benefits and preferences in collective actions. I focus on evolutionary models that predict how individual efforts and fitnesses, group efforts and the amount of produced collective goods depend on the group's size and heterogeneity, as well as on the benefit and cost functions and parameters. I consider collective actions that aim to overcome the challenges from nature or win competition with neighbouring groups of co-specifics. I show that the largest contributors towards production of collective goods will typically be group members with the highest stake in it or for whom the effort is least costly, or those who have the largest capability or initial endowment. Under some conditions, such group members end up with smaller net pay-offs than the rest of the group. That is, they effectively behave as altruists. With weak nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, the group effort typically decreases with group size and increases with within-group heterogeneity. With strong nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, these patterns are reversed. I discuss the implications of theoretical results for animal behaviour, human origins and psychology.

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Section: (I) Homogeneous Groupsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Gavrilets

2015

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

113

133

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“…Within the area of dynamics, two-player games [14][15][16] are frequently adopted to model typical pairwise interactions to understand the evolution of cooperation [17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26]. Considering the ubiquitously group interactions ranging from the natural world to human society, researchers recently generalized two-player games to their multiplayer versions [27][28][29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37], such as the N -person prisoner's dilemma [30,38], N-person snowdrift game [31,32], N -person stag hunt game [39], as well as the N -person ultimatum game [40]. In a typical collective action, an individual's payoff could be no longer the simple summation of many pairwise interactions [33,41], and instead it is replaced by the multiple interactive payoffs from multiplayer games, which depends on what strategies all other opponents hold in the same group.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, as we consider general group interactions in structured populations, we are provided with a much greater chance to explore the effects of population structure on the evolution of cooperation. However, due to its inherent complexity, until now the evolutionary dynamics has only been given for some specific games or well-mixed populations [12,31,32,39,44,45,48,53,54]. Here we give the evolutionary dynamics for an arbitrary multiplayer game with two strategies in structured populations represented by regular…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations

Broom

et al. 2016

Phys. Rev. E

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The evolution of populations is influenced by many factors, and the simple classical models have been developed in a number of important ways. Both population structure and multiplayer interactions have been shown to significantly affect the evolution of important properties, such as the level of cooperation or of aggressive behavior. Here we combine these two key factors and develop the evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations represented by regular graphs. The traditional linear and threshold public goods games are adopted as models to address the dynamics. We show that for linear group interactions, population structure can favor the evolution of cooperation compared to the well-mixed case, and we see that the more neighbors there are, the harder it is for cooperators to persist in structured populations. We further show that threshold group interactions could lead to the emergence of cooperation even in well-mixed populations. Here population structure sometimes inhibits cooperation for the threshold public goods game, where depending on the benefit to cost ratio, the outcomes are bistability or a monomorphic population of defectors or cooperators. Our results suggest, counterintuitively, that structured populations are not always beneficial for the evolution of cooperation for nonlinear group interactions.

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“…Both individuals of a cooperative partnership might therefore play a mixed strategy of either cooperating or conflicting with their counter-partners, and whether they cooperate or conflict might only depend on the direct benefit received in a given situation [18][19][20][21]. In a system with limited dispersal or exit cost for the individuals involved, the more difficult it is for the involved individuals to disperse to other colonies or groups, the more viable the sanction of the dominate or host against the non-cooperative subordinate will be [7,9,39,40]. The subordinate or symbiont might therefore tend to cooperate with the dominate in such a system.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation

Wang

et al. 2010

Sci. China Life Sci.

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Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk-Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.

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Cooperative behavior in a model of evolutionary snowdrift games with N-person interactions

Cited by 108 publications

References 27 publications

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations

Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation

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