Cooperative and Non-Cooperative R&D Policy in an Economic Union

Abstract

© Dette eksemplar er fremstilt etter avtale med KOPINOR, Stenergate 1, 0050 Oslo. Ytterligere eksemplarfremstilling uten avtale og i strid med åndsverkloven er straffbart og kan medføre erstatningsansvar. 6,6 &(175( ) 25 ,17(51$7,21$/ (&2120,&6 $1' 6+,33,1* SIØS -Centre for international economics and shipping -is a joint centre for The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) and Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF). The centre is responsible for research and teaching within the fields of international trade and shipping. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 7UDGHThe centre works with all types of issues related to international trade and shipping, and has particular expertise in the areas of international real economics (trade, factor mobility, economic integration and industrial policy), international macroeconomics and international tax policy. Research at the centre has in general been dominated by projects aiming to provide increased insight into global, structural issues and the effect of regional economic integration. However, the researchers at the centre also participate actively in projects relating to public economics, industrial policy and competition policy. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 7UDQVSRUWInternational transport is another central area of research at the centre. Within this field, studies of the competition between different modes of transport in Europe and the possibilities of increasing sea transport with a view to easing the pressure on the land based transport network on the Continent have been central. 0DULWLPH 5HVHDUFKOne of the main tasks of the centre is to act as a link between the maritime industry and the research environment at SNF and NHH. A series of projects that are financed by the Norwegian Shipowners Association and aimed directly at ship owning firms and other maritime companies have been conducted at the centre. These projects include studies of Norwegian Shipowners' multinational activities, shipbuilding in Northern Europe and the competition in the ferry markets. +XPDQ 5HVRXUFHVThe centre's human resources include researchers at SNF and affiliated professors at NHH as well as leading international economists who are affiliated to the centre through long-term relations. During the last few years the centre has produced five PhDs within international economics and shipping.

Strategic Research and Development Policy: Societal Objectives and the Corporate Welfare Argument

“…The symmetric game of Haaland and Kind (2006), and to a lesser extent their 2004 working paper, is, as far as we know, the analysis in the literature closest to that of the present article in that they have R&D subsidies in a full international intra‐industry trade model, that consumers in both countries buy the output of both firms. Many of the formal assumptions of the present article are similar to the symmetric model of Haaland and Kind (2006) as well: improvements in quality shift out the demand function, the cost of quality function is quadratic and independent of quantity, and consumer surplus is included in social surplus. Their asymmetric model differs significantly from our asymmetric model in that they do not consider bidirectional intra‐industry trade.…”

“…We suspect that the reason may be their firms play a one‐stage game where quality is a tactical variable, while ours play a two‐stage game where quality is a strategic variable. In any event, formally, Haaland and Kind (2006) give policymakers no guidance on the question of whether R&D subsidies are corporate welfare. More invidiously, if a policymaker thinks that raising profit is corporate welfare, regardless of the effect on social surplus, then Haaland and Kind’s analysis would lead the policymaker to precisely the wrong conclusion, namely, that all R&D subsidies are corporate welfare.…”

R&D Policy Involving Consumer-Friendly Strategy: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative R&D

“…It affirmed the importance of a proper R&D policy for rent shifting of firms. On such a basis, Haaland and Kind (2006) have elaborated on the implications of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies, and indicated that the optimal R&D policy should consider the consumer-surplus effects and producer-stealing effects of R&D under the market with imperfect competition. Haaland and Kind (2008) further indicated that coordinated strategy harmonization eliminates policy competition, but it is not necessary to ensure welfare maximization.…”

R&D subsidy games: a cost sharing approach vs. reward for performance

“…The formal assumptions of the paper follow those of Gretz et al (2009), Haaland and Kind (2006), and DeCourcy (2005. A two-country two-firm intra-industry trade model is used; the formal game has three stages: first, governments announce their policies, then firms decide their R&D spending, and finally Cournot-quantities are determined.…”