Cooperation under institutional incentives with perfect and imperfect observation

Gao, Shiping; Liang, Jinling

doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126723

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Choosing C by both of the agents can bring mutual benefits, whereas each of them has the temptation T to betray the other [44]. Such a situation is quite common in our daily life, and is often characterized using the Prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) [31,45]. We select PDG as the basic game model, 1 while the pay-off matrix is given in table 1.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In practice, tax, membership fee, or commission fee are common resources imposed by the third party for maintaining the order of the community or market [31,47,48]. This study assumes the income of the third party is composed of two parts: (1) the basic commission fee c0 paid by the agents in each round [49]; (2) the fine retrieved from the defectors [50,51].…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The enforcement of incentives can be costly [27][28][29], and thus the incentive might be terminated if the resource for implementation cannot cover the cost. Despite the fact that it is reasonable to assume that the resource for implementing incentives is inexhaustible [30,31] under the peer reward or peer punishment scenario, as volunteer punishment and altruistic rewarding can always emerge [32,33]. Nevertheless, it is not the case when incentives are enforced in an institutional manner by the third party [34,35].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Costly incentives design from an institutional perspective: cooperation, sustainability and affluence

et al. 2022

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Incentives are usually introduced by the regulator entity (third-party), to promote cooperation in a market. The implementation of incentives is always costly and thus might fail to be enforced sustainably. This work aims at exploring the effects of incentives from an institutional perspective, while coping with the scenario where the third-party is part of the system but not composed by players. The evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework is applied to identify the incentives that lead to pure cooperation. In contrast to traditional EGT, this paper introduces an elimination mechanism that can reduce the market size. The incentives identified in the EGT analysis are further examined in simulation experiments which measure the market size, affluence and sustainability. The findings show: (1) light punishment leads to a reduction of the market size, yet heavier punishment is beneficial to the market size and wealth; (2) mixed incentives will generally lead to different wealth of the third party and of the participants. While under moderate strength, the wealth of both parties is the same and their overall wealth is maximal; (3) for sustainability, pure punishment (resp. reward) is sustainable (resp. unsustainable), the sustainability of mixed incentives depends on both their strength and agents’ rationality level.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Costly incentives design from an institutional perspective: cooperation, sustainability and affluence

et al. 2022

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“…Without exaggeration, hundreds of research papers were published by scientists with biology, economics, applied mathematics, or statistical physics background, in which they proposed different microscopic models to increase the general willingness of actors to cooperate with their partners [8,9,10,11,12]. In some cases the desired evolutionary outcome is expected, for example when defection is punished or cooperation is awarded by individuals or by a governing institution [13,14,15,16,17,18,19]. In these cases, however, the proper question is how to avoid the so-called secondorder free-riding, when a cooperator player is reluctant to contribute and maintain the mentioned cooperation supporting institution or behavior [20,21,22,23].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation

Szolnoki,

Perc

2021

Preprint

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According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a competing strategy. But this information is not always accurate. To avoid ambiguity a learner may therefore decide to collect a more reliable statistics by averaging the payoff values of its opponents in the neighborhood, and makes a decision afterwards. This simple alteration of the standard microscopic protocol significantly improves the cooperation level in a population. Furthermore, the positive impact can be strengthened by increasing the role of the environment and the size of the evaluation circle. The mechanism that explains this improvement is based on a self-organizing process which reveals the detrimental consequence of defector aggregation that remains partly hidden during face-to-face comparisons. Notably, the reported phenomenon is not limited to lattice populations but remains valid also for systems described by irregular interaction networks.

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“…In some cases it seems reasonable to punish defectors who just exploit others' efforts without contributing to the common pool, or rewarding those who do [29,30,31,32,33]. Furthermore, it also seems plausible to cooperate with those who have a higher reputation because of their previous positive acts and break interaction with those who have a negative fame [34,35,36].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Small Fraction of Selective Cooperators Can Elevate General Wellbeing Significantly

Lee,

Cleveland,

Szolnoki

2021

Preprint

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A cooperative player invests effort into a common venture without knowing the partner's intention in advance. But this strategy can be implemented in various ways when a player is involved in different games simultaneously. Interestingly, if cooperative players distinguish their neighbors and allocate all their external investments into the most successful partner's game exclusively then a significant cooperation level can be reached even at harsh circumstances where game parameters would dictate full defection otherwise. This positive impact, however, can also be reached when just a smaller fraction of players apply this sophisticated investment protocol during the game. To confirm this hypothesis we have checked several distributions that determine the fraction of supporting players who apply the mentioned selective investment protocol. Notably, when these players are not isolated, but their influences percolate then the whole population may enjoy the benefit of full cooperation already at a relatively low value of the synergy factor which represents the dilemma strength in the applied public goods game.

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Cooperation under institutional incentives with perfect and imperfect observation

Cited by 8 publications

References 52 publications

Costly incentives design from an institutional perspective: cooperation, sustainability and affluence

Costly incentives design from an institutional perspective: cooperation, sustainability and affluence

The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation

Small Fraction of Selective Cooperators Can Elevate General Wellbeing Significantly

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