Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule

Pongou, Roland; Lambo, Lawrence Diffo; Tchantcho, Bertrand

doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0251-6

Cited by 13 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…For example the largest consistent set, introduced by Chwe (1994) or the model of consistently far-sightedness introduced by Chakravorti (1999). More recently, an interesting development is given by Pongou et al (2008).…”

Section: Definition 15mentioning

confidence: 98%

Social Choice and Cooperative Game Theory: Voting Games as Social Aggregation Functions

Mathieu

Salles

2013

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.

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Section: Definition 15mentioning

confidence: 98%

Social Choice and Cooperative Game Theory: Voting Games as Social Aggregation Functions

Mathieu

Salles

2013

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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“…The Pareto criterion is another widely accepted measure of social well‐being in the literature. An alternative is Pareto‐optimal if it makes at least one individual better off and no other worse off by choosing it (Dougherty and Edward ; Mueller ; Pongou, Lambo, and Tchantcho ). The incompatibility with the Condorcet‐winner criterion and the consistency with the Pareto collective optimality and Condorcet‐loser criterion are characteristics of the most common procedures of social choice.…”

Section: The Misrepresentation Of Invalid Voting and Abstentionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Invalid Votes, Deliberate Abstentions, and the Brazilian Crisis of Representation

Nepomuceno

Costa

2019

Politics & Policy

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August 31, 2016 registered the historical impeachment of Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff, indicted for contravening the budget law and misstating the public deficit that propelled the country into deep economic recession. Many disagreements on this matter have permeated the country’s conflict atmosphere, supported by arguments that the collective will of more than 54 million voters was disrespected. Based on 3,010 interviews conducted in 204 Brazilian cities, we construct a pairwise comparison to present arguments that Rousseff had no legitimate representation in the 2014 national elections. We demonstrate how the suboptimal support of invalid votes and deliberate abstentions might have misrepresented the results of Brazilian presidential election by choosing a pseudo‐Condorcet loser candidate. The results in the Brazilian case study presented here point to the weakness in the social process of aggregating preferences by relative or absolute majority, and sets out recommendations. Related Articles Galatas, Steven. 2008. “‘None of the Above?’ Casting Blank Ballots in Ontario Provincial Elections.” Politics & Policy 36 (3): 448‐473. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00116.x Stockemer, Daniel. 2013. “Corruption and Turnout in Presidential Elections: A Macro‐Level Quantitative Analysis.” Politics & Policy 41 (2): 189‐212. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12012 Stockemer, Daniel, and Stephanie Parent. 2014. “The Inequality Turnout Nexus: New Evidence from Presidential Elections.” Politics & Policy 42 (2): 221‐245. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12067 Related Media The Conversation. 2017. “Kenneth Arrow’s Legacy and Why Elections Can Be Flawed.” March 1. https://theconversation.com/kenneth-arrows-legacy-and-why-elections-can-be-flawed-73675

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A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games

Tchantcho

Lambo

2007

Econ Theory

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Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule

Abstract: Collective choice, Cooperation, Binding solidarity agreements, Stability, Pareto-optimality, C70, C71, D70, D71, D72,

Cited by 13 publications

References 16 publications

Social Choice and Cooperative Game Theory: Voting Games as Social Aggregation Functions

Social Choice and Cooperative Game Theory: Voting Games as Social Aggregation Functions

Invalid Votes, Deliberate Abstentions, and the Brazilian Crisis of Representation

A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games

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