Cooperation in the commons

Polasky, Stephen; Tarui, Nori; Ellis, Gregory M.; Mason, Charles F.

doi:10.1007/s00199-005-0018-x

Cited by 36 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Gutiérrez et al (2011) have investigated factors that contribute to the success of comanagement initiatives in Latin American countries and elsewhere. Relevant factors, especially for meeting social-ecological goals in small-scale fisheries, include trust, cooperation, leadership, and community cohesion (Polasky et al 2006, Boyd 2010, Gutiérrez et al 2010.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of cooperation for improved stewardship of marine social-ecological systems in Latin America

Villasante¹,

Österblom²

2015

E&S

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

ABSTRACT. Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries are among the worlds' richest in marine biodiversity. Fish stocks in these regions are important for fishing communities, and fishing activities engage several million people. These fisheries depend on the natural services provided by a diverse range of marine social-ecological systems, but many LAC fisheries are in a degraded state, and concerns about overexploitation are widespread. With most fishery resources fully exploited or overexploited, opportunities for development lie primarily in restoring depleted stocks and using stocks more efficiently. The papers published in the Special Feature "Cooperation, Local Communities, and Marine Social-Ecological Systems: New Findings from Latin America" present a range of experiences with ecosystem stewardship in the region and highlight promising perspectives for the future. The Special Feature consists of papers that deal with new findings from case studies which show how cooperation is key for building resilience in LAC fisheries. These case studies illustrate the effects of different types of cooperation and the roles of diverse stakeholders (fishers, scientists, environmental nongovernmental organizations, and national administrations, among others) in different countries of the region. Combined, these papers describe social processes, leadership, and institutional and organizational changes of relevance for stewardship of marine social-ecological systems in Latin America. The field of resilience research is still in an explorative phase in the region, and our ambition with this Special Feature is that the new discoveries presented may stimulate additional research in this field, including increased international cooperation with LAC scientists.RESUMEN. Los países de América Latina y El Caribe concentran una de las áreas de mayor biodiversidad marina del mundo. Las pesquerías comerciales en estas regiones aportan una elevada fuente de ingresos económicos para millones de personas. A pesar de que estas pesquerías dependen de los servicios ecosistémicos aportados por una gran variedad de sistemas marinos socio-ecológicos, gran parte de ellas continúan degradándose, y la preocupación por reducir la sobreexplotación está ampliamente extendida entre la comunidad científica. Con la mayoría de los stocks completamente explotados o sobreexplotados, las oportunidades para el desarrollo de las pesquerías dependen fundamentalmente en la recuperación de los stocks a través de su uso más racional. Los trabajos publicados en este monográfico "Cooperation, Local Communities, and Marine Social-Ecological Systems: New Findings from Latin America" presentan una variedad de experiencias e gestión pesquera en la región y resaltan perspectivas y resultados prometedores para el futuro de la región. El monográfico incluye trabajos muestran, desde diferentes disciplinas, enfoques y metodologías, que la cooperación resulta clave para la resiliencia de las pesquerías comerciales de América Latina y El Caribe. Estos casos de estudio ilu...

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of cooperation for improved stewardship of marine social-ecological systems in Latin America

Villasante¹,

Österblom²

2015

E&S

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Related approaches have been applied to open-access fisheries (Polasky et al, 2006), transboundary wildlife management (Bhat and Huffaker, 2007), and international pollution (Germain et al, 2009). Analysis of this topic using cooperative game theory is the subject of Dinar et al (2006) and Beard and MacDonald (2007).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Enforcing Agreements on Water Allocation

Ansink

2009

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

SummaryMany water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement. I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the "downstream incremental distribution", an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries. Keywords AbstractMany water allocation agreements in transboundary river basins are inherently unstable. Due to stochastic river flow, agreements may be broken in case of drought. The objective of this paper is to analyse whether water allocation agreements can be self-enforcing. An agreement is modelled as the outcome of bargaining game on river water allocation. Given this agreement, the bargaining game is followed by a repeated extensive-form game in which countries decide whether or not to comply with the agreement.I assess under what conditions such agreements are self-enforcing, given stochastic river flow. The results show that, for sufficiently low discounting, every efficient agreement can be sustained in subgame perfect equilibrium. Requiring renegotiation-proofness may shrink the set of possible agreements to a unique self-enforcing agreement. The solution induced by this particular agreement implements the "downstream incremental distribution", an axiomatic solution to water allocation that assigns all gains from cooperation to downstream countries.

show abstract

“…The original science paper from Axelrod and Hamilton [9] acquires more than 20,000 citations on google scholar, some 2000 more than "The tragedy of the commons".) A paper which proposes a credible, renegotiation-proof (a dynamic Nash equilibrium is said to be renegotiation-proof when no player, or group of players, has an incentive to deviate from its path of actions at a later point in time) threat strategy in the dynamic game that was discussed above is from Polasky et al [10]. The idea is the following (see Figure 6): The players start the game and harvest cooperatively at the socially optimal stock level, equally sharing the ensuing surplus.…”

Section: Cooperation In the Commonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast, Mason et al [12] (basically the same authors as in [10]) model a truly dynamic game where the benefits from reduced emissions depend on the stock of pollution which accumulates over time. As in the renewable-resource game, they propose a two-phase scheme with a harsh punishment (which is arbitrarily set at some constant level).…”

Section: Game Theory Cooperation and Climate Changementioning

confidence: 99%

The Tragedy of the Commons from a Game-Theoretic Perspective

Diekert

2012

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Twenty years after the declarations from the Earth Summit in Rio, the world faces an unattenuated host of problems that threaten the goal of sustainable development. The challenge to cooperatively solve socio-ecological problems has been portrayed in Garrett Hardin's essay "The Tragedy of the Commons". While this paper remains controversial, it has inspired a vast number of theoretical, experimental, and empirical contributions that have clarified the mechanisms of collective action problems and suggested ways to overcome these. This article reviews the recent game-theoretic research in this field.

show abstract

Cooperation in the commons

Abstract: Common property resource, Cooperation, Dynamic game, D62, Q20,

Cited by 36 publications

References 22 publications

The role of cooperation for improved stewardship of marine social-ecological systems in Latin America

The role of cooperation for improved stewardship of marine social-ecological systems in Latin America

Self-Enforcing Agreements on Water Allocation

The Tragedy of the Commons from a Game-Theoretic Perspective

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About