Cooperation in Context

Abstract

Economic game experiments have become a prominent method among social scientists developing and testing theories of cooperation. These games provide a valuable opportunity to generate measures of cooperation that can be compared from one place to the next, yet challenges remain in how to interpret cross-cultural differences in these experiments and connect them to cooperation in naturally occurring contexts. I address these challenges by examining framing effects in public goods games (PGGs) with salmon fishers and reindeer herders in Kamchatka, Russia. Combining standard versions of the game with versions that refer to post-Soviet institutions coordinating fishing and herding, I show that ( 1 ) average contributions in the PGG in Kamchatka are substantially higher than reported elsewhere and (2) framing the PGG alters the relationship between contributions and expectations, shifting strategies away from unconditional generosity and toward conditional cooperation. My analysis, by synthesizing quantitative analysis of PGG data with long-term qualitative ethnography, including extensive postgame interviews with participants, supports the notion that cooperation in economic games increases along with cultural norms, values, and institutions that emerge from economic interdependence. Framing effects suggest that researchers should devote more attention to investigating the relationship between contributions and expectations.

Potentials and Constraints of Common Pasture Use – Field Experiments on Common Pool Resource Management in Azerbaijan and Georgia

“…A possible explanation, as indicated also by the econometric model, is the real-world grazing pressure on pastures, which is higher in Azerbaijan than in Georgia (Neudert et al 2019). A further possible explanation could be that, according to Gerkey (2013), shared cultural values and norms and institutions increase cooperation, especially when they emerge from economic interdependence which in Azerbaijan, due to the absence of bridging social capital, is an important factor shaping social interaction.…”

Folk-economic beliefs as “evidential fiction”: Putting the economic public discourse back on track

“…But what we do know is that when input conditions, or frames, are provided to participants, results can vary from the empirically robust classical findings. For instance, they can deviate subtly when subtle framing cues are presented (e.g., Cronk 2007;Cronk & Wasielewski 2008;Eriksson & Strimling 2014;Gerkey 2013;Keser & van Winden 2000;Liberman 2004;Leliveld et al 2008), and they can deviate dramatically when even slightly more detailed framing scenarios are presented (Lightner et al 2017). More important, these cited framing effects all deviate from standard findings in a way that reflects the social norms associated with the provided context in each experiment.…”

Preferences and constraints: The value of economic games for studying human sociality

“…If real-world relationships or rare or hard-to-observe interactions are part of your research focus, consider revealing some characteristics of the recipients to the decider-for example, identifying recipients by name, photo [12,28,29], or group or community membership [47]. If everyday generosity is of interest, rather than giving participants a windfall of free money for game play, consider designing the game such that deciders are required to earn the money they give away (see [76] for useful discussion).…”