Cooperation dynamics in multiple correlated games: A review

Abstract

Individuals often engage in complex, non-isolated interactive environments. The interde-pendence manifested by strategic interaction environments across multiple dimensions or attributes has advanced the recognition of correlated games. The behavioral choices in one strategic scenario can be influenced by strategic attempts in another. How the correlation between different strategic environments affects the cooperation dynamics has raised much attention recently. In this perspective, we overview the latest progress that accounts for such cross-reciprocity. Firstly, we focus on the cases where individuals consecutively interact in environments with varying payoff structures, the values of which depend on the behaviors present in the previous game. Secondly, we pay attention to how strategic interaction affects the dynamics in multi-issue games in which individuals simultaneously interact in different environments. It holds significant implications for further examining the evolution of be-havior from the perspective of correlations between different scenarios in prospects. Finally, we come up with some potential directions and points for further research.