Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy

Abstract

I consider a model in which two states choose how much to arm and whether to attack in successive periods. Arms are useful not only for deterrence or taking territory, but also because they influence the resolution of a set of disputed issues. States can cooperate on the issues by limiting military competition, but only as far as an endogenous “war constraint” allows. Factors determining the tightness of the war constraint imply hypotheses about the international determinants of military effort and thus the costs of anarchy. The strategic logic differs from standard security-dilemma arguments, in which the costs of anarchy are associated with conflict between status quo states that are uncertain about others' territorial revisionism. Here, inefficiency arises because arming to deter lowers a state's value for living with the status quo, which creates a security externality and a feedback loop. The model both synthesizes and revises a range of theoretical arguments about the determinants of interstate cooperation and conflict.

Aims, claims, and the bargaining model of war

“…Some of these explanations hinge on international developments, such as the role of the United Nations and international organizations (Zacher, 2001;Goertz, Diehl, and Balas, 2016), the bipolar competition between the superpowers (Waltz, 1979), or the role of the United States in promoting or policing the norm (Fazal, 2007, 47-52). Other explanations, however, rest on factors that have changed the relative costs and benefits of acquiring new territory, such as the spread of democracy (Morrow et al, 2006;Fearon, 2018) or the declining value of territory for economic welfare due to the rising importance of trade and foreign direct investment (Rosecrance, 1986;Brooks, 2007). In Africa, where there was a strong norm of respecting inherited borders in spite of their imposed and artificial nature, Goemans and Schultz (2017) note that many states saw territorial expansion as unattractive because it would increase ethnic heterogeneity and exacerbate challenges of governance.…”

“…States may be satisfied with what they have and would not demand more even if the opportunity presented itself. Fearon (2018) shows that decreasing the value of territory diminishes the level of armaments needed to achieve stable relations. We show that, in a world of states with limited aims, bargaining can become easier, because smaller claims become credible and, as a result, more effective at defusing disputes peacefully.…”

The Logic of Violence in Drug War

“…We maintain the functional form assumption in the main text not because it is required, but because relaxing it would necessitate more complex notation throughout. literature (Fearon 2018;Skaperdas 1996). Moreover, it is well-motivated: the marginal return to the first firearm should be greater than the marginal return to the thousandth.…”

Why Arms Control Is So Rare

“…An obvious answer to why states rarely agree to arms control is that they fear an opponent will cheat in secret and then exploit the resulting advantage. Recent theories of arming assume that states have conflicts of interest and that they cannot perfectly observe each other’s arming, which encourages them to arm covertly and thereby undermines arms control (Baliga and Sjöström 2008; Bas and Coe 2016, 2018; Benson and Wen 2011; Debs and Monteiro 2014; Fearon 2011, 2018; Jackson and Morelli 2009; Meirowitz and Sartori 2008; Powell 1993). 4 Earlier work on the security dilemma argued that even if states lacked conflicts of interest, arming could arise out of one side’s fear that the other had revisionist interests and so would cheat on any agreed limits.…”

“… 4 Fearon (2011, 2018) and Powell (1993) ostensibly take arming to be perfectly observable, but assume that each side can complete some bounded amount of arming before the other side can observe this and react, which is equivalent to imposing limits on the observability of arming.…”