Cooperation and conflict in the European defence-industrial field: the role of relative gains

Calcara, Antonio

doi:10.1080/14702436.2018.1487766

Cited by 19 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Comparison of budget expenditures for defense of NATO and Ukraine indicates their significant difference [12,13,14,15,16,17]. According to the study, the budget of NATO countries shows three main blocks: the cost of personnel (Personnel Expenditure) ~ 30 -50%; operating costs (including training of troops ~ 25%; costs of research and development (hereinafter, R & D) in the field of defense (Defense R&T Expenditure) ≤10% and costs of purchasing defense equipment (Defence Equipment Procurement Expenditure) ~ 20-30% [13] For the period up to 2014, the item of expenditures for the maintenance of personnel of the Armed Forces was the main part of the defense budget of Ukraine (for example, in 2010 this part was 87.9% of the total defense budget), which resulted in the impossibility of long-term development of the armed forces [18].…”

Section: Empirical Results and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The profits of defense companies are reduced to this level by "Guidelines for common approaches in the application of certain provisions defined by the Cabinet of Ministers №517 from 08.08.2016" approved by the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine in order to reduce budget expenditures [14]. This decision of the Defence Ministry achieved the goal to reduce government spending, but, on the other hand, it also limited the ability of defense companies to use their own funds to finance their own developments without spending time on coordination and further expectations of budget funding, which otherwise would significantly accelerate the introduction of new models needed by the troops [12,28,29,31].…”

Section: Empirical Results and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Logistics and financial regulation of the defense-industrial complex in the system of troops

Lisovenko¹,

Burdeina²,

Fedchenko³

et al. 2021

E3S Web Conf.

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The study is devoted to the problem of financial regulation of the defense industry and the provision of troops, as the escalation of the military conflict in eastern Ukraine has revealed shortcomings in this area. A comparative analysis of NATO and Ukraine’s defense spending was conducted and differences in the cost structure were identified. The tendency of Ukraine’s defense spending to gradually approach the structure of NATO defense spending is pointed out, but the insufficient level of this approach is also taken into account. The analysis allowed to identify problematic issues and inconsistencies in the financial regulation of the defense industry. The state of export of defense equipment and technologies as a possible source of financing of defense enterprises is analyzed. The existence of two opposite trends in the financial regulation of military logistics has been identified: both an increase in funding in absolute terms and a reduction in the share of the total amount for the implementation of the unified logistics system of the State Armed Forces Development Program. The developed mathematical model of supply of military units is suitable for use in information systems of logistical support of troops.

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Section: Empirical Results and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Empirical Results and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logistics and financial regulation of the defense-industrial complex in the system of troops

Lisovenko¹,

Burdeina²,

Fedchenko³

et al. 2021

E3S Web Conf.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Most importantly, Calcara (2018, p. 493) stresses that 'in spite of the potential absolute gains in pursuing joint initiatives in the defence-industrial landscape', European governments and industries are hesitant in sharing defence technologies which have been developed with national resources and they need to consider how technology transfer could strengthen rivals' position in the regional and global market'. Calcara's (2018) findings are supported by Kanniainen & Lehtonen (2020), who, by drawing on a game theory model, identify four reasons why collaborative defence acquisition is more of an exception in NATO and the EU than the rule: First, key user requirements are nation-specific with important implications for national security. Second, nations that place a low value on a weapon system have more bargaining power than nations that place a high value on a weapon system and may require a side payment to enter a procurement collaboration that the other side is not willing to pay.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

Defence acquisition: a WICKED problem?

Verlaine

2022

RBS

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Defence acquisition is a complex undertaking involving multiple actors and processes. However, in recent years, the US and UK defence acquisition frameworks have been criticised for not being able to cope with the complex and uncertain nature of defence. The paper takes this criticism and argues that defence acquisition is best understood as a “wicked problem” in which collective processes tie the system into large and interconnected networks of systems, not as a traditional linear science problem. In particular, the paper demonstrates that the Linear Transformation Model, at the heart of the US and UK defence acquisition framework, is ill-designed to cope with the complex and uncertain nature of both defence outputs and outcomes. The main reasons are technological maturity, information asymmetry and the need for interpretation and judgement. Furthermore, the paper elaborates that defence acquisition is characterised by a “problem of theory” and a “problem of practice” and that further research is necessary in order to transform its institutional culture and tackle the theory-practice divide with a more holistic approach.

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“…The advantages of the free European market is to win in terms of lower prices but also in quality (Calcara 2018). In such a context, a common EU defence industry market would clearly be preferable.…”

Section: Governance Choices For Small State Defence Industriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defence industries in small European states: Key contemporary challenges and opportunities

Ploom¹,

Kalvet²,

Tiits³

2022

Journal of International Studies

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This study addresses the challenges and opportunities that small European states face when weighing their defence industrial policy options. The article builds on a technology–based small state industry governance model by adding a defence industry–specific layer. This model is used to analyse how defence industries of small states could contribute to the European Union common defence industrial policy, and how the latter could likewise be beneficial to small member states. The paper discusses defence industrial policy challenges and opportunities both from the wider European Union and small state perspective. Global and regional geopolitical trends are explored among other specific topics, as are aspects of regional and domestic governance like the market structure, procurement, and R&D. The article concludes that small European states could both win and lose with the establishment of a common defence market, depending on the market design. Ideally, it should be combined with the simultaneous creation of an EU defence industrial policy that enables smaller, and especially less developed, member states to maintain and advance their own industries, preferably participating within the value chains of defence industries of the larger countries.

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Cooperation and conflict in the European defence-industrial field: the role of relative gains

Cited by 19 publications

References 41 publications

Logistics and financial regulation of the defense-industrial complex in the system of troops

Logistics and financial regulation of the defense-industrial complex in the system of troops

Defence acquisition: a WICKED problem?

Defence industries in small European states: Key contemporary challenges and opportunities

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