Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects

Feldman, Michal; Tamir, Tami

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_38

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…We will refer to that model in this work. [22] showed that using the Max-Cost deviator rule, tightly bounds the convergence rate to 1.5n (worst-case) in these games. The Max-Cost deviator rule was also considered in [30] for Swap-Games [4].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

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The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics

Feldman

Snappir

Tamir

2017

Algorithmic Game Theory

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Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform their best response moves. A deviator rule S is a method for selecting the next deviating player. We provide a measure for quantifying the performance of different deviator rules. The inefficiency of a deviator rule S is the maximum ratio, over all initial profiles p, between the social cost of the worst equilibrium reachable by S from p and the social cost of the best equilibrium reachable from p. This inefficiency always lies between 1 and the price of anarchy.We study the inefficiency of various deviator rules in network formation games and job scheduling games (both are congestion games, where BR dynamics always converges to a pure NE). For some classes of games, we compute optimal deviator rules. Furthermore, we define and study a new class of deviator rules, called local deviator rules. Such rules choose the next deviator as a function of a restricted set of parameters, and satisfy a natural condition called independence of irrelevant players. We present upper bounds on the inefficiency of some local deviator rules, and also show that for some classes of games, no local deviator rule can guarantee inefficiency lower than the price of anarchy. * A preliminary version appears in the proc.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…x . As [22] showed, the cost function exhibits the following structure. Denote by l * the load minimizing the players' cost.…”

Section: Job Scheduling Games With Conflicting Congestions Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics

Feldman

Snappir

Tamir

2017

Algorithmic Game Theory

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“…Simultaneous updating by all players at each time step is studied in Quint et al (1997) for 2-player games and in Kash et al (2011) for anonymous games. Feldman and Tamir (2012) study the case in which the sequence of play depends on current payoffs. Feldman et al (2017) study the dynamic inefficiency of the best-response dynamic under different playing sequences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%