2002
DOI: 10.1145/571697.571724
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Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network

Abstract: The current Internet infrastructure has very few built-in protection mechanisms, and is therefore vulnerable to attacks and failures. In particular, recent events have illustrated the Internet's vulnerability to both denial of service (DoS) attacks and flash crowds in which one or more links in the network (or servers at the edge of the network) become severely congested. In both DoS attacks and flash crowds the congestion is due neither to a single flow, nor to a general increase in traffic, but to a well-def… Show more

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Cited by 559 publications
(406 citation statements)
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References 20 publications
(27 reference statements)
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“…Bandwidth exhaustion attack: finally, we note that SES-RAA does not mitigate pure bandwidth exhaustion attacks (for example, UDP flood). SESRAA solely focuses on the issue of botnet-style resource exhaustion via legitimate requests for which traditional SYN-flood pushback-style mechanisms [17,18] would offer little benefit. SESRAA does not preclude the use of these techniques to filter out unwanted traffic and is largely complementary to those techniques.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Bandwidth exhaustion attack: finally, we note that SES-RAA does not mitigate pure bandwidth exhaustion attacks (for example, UDP flood). SESRAA solely focuses on the issue of botnet-style resource exhaustion via legitimate requests for which traditional SYN-flood pushback-style mechanisms [17,18] would offer little benefit. SESRAA does not preclude the use of these techniques to filter out unwanted traffic and is largely complementary to those techniques.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bandwidth depletion attack can be mitigated by filtering unwanted traffic earlier which would have been discarded anyway later at the end server (for example, UDP data flood). In Reference [17], Mahajan et al propose a pushback mechanism to control aggregates at the upstream router. The rate limiting scheme from the upstream gateway can be combined with our approach to provide a comprehensive end host defense against DDoS attacks.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The dynamic decisions of the recursive traversal of the translation table graph, as well as the persistent state, help DRUID to be more adaptive and context dependent, so that various protections and compensation can be added as needed, delaying the cost of expensive mechanisms until they are of real benefit. For example, certain types of DDoS protection [37,41] require adding marks to packets and checking for those marks at various points in the network. DRUID's ability to add and remove blocks dynamically would permit inserting and removing the necessary blocks at the appropriate locations only when DDoS defense was actually required, rather than at all times.…”
Section: Issues and Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chow et al [9] propose a similar framework, where edge routers periodically obtain information from core routers, and adjust conditioner parameters accordingly. Aggregate-based Congestion Control (ACC) detects and controls high bandwidth aggregate flows [29].…”
Section: Congestion Collapsementioning
confidence: 99%