Controlling Best Response Dynamics for Network Games

Fazli, MohammadAmin; Maazallahi, Abbas; Habibi, Jafar

doi:10.1109/tnse.2018.2814590

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Projection dynamics was proposed as a model in transport system [23] and later applied to complimentary formalism [45]. Best response dynamics have found applications in complex social networks [46], internet and network economics [47]. Clearly the vast applications of the aforementioned evolutionary dynamics in different domains are quite appealing and motivate one to study their dynamics in depth while appreciating their implications.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Periodic orbit can be evolutionarily stable: Case Study of discrete replicator dynamics

Mukhopadhyay

Chakraborty

2020

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or chaotic solution is many a time perceived as a shortcoming of the corresponding game dynamic because (Nash) equilibrium play is supposed to be robust and persistent behaviour, and any other behaviour in nature is deemed transient. Consequently, there is a lack of attempt to connect the non-fixed point solutions with the game theoretic concepts. Here we provide a way to render game theoretic meaning to periodic solutions. To this end, we consider a replicator map that models Darwinian selection mechanism in unstructured infinite-sized population whose individuals reproduce asexually forming non-overlapping generations. This is one of the simplest evolutionary game dynamic that exhibits periodic solutions giving way to chaotic solutions (as parameters related to reproductive fitness change) and also obeys the folk theorems connecting fixed point solutions with Nash equilibrium. Interestingly, we find that a modified Darwinian fitness-termed heterogeneity payoff-in the corresponding population game must be put forward as (conventional) fitness times the probability that two arbitrarily chosen individuals of the population adopt two different strategies. The evolutionary dynamics proceeds as if the individuals optimize the heterogeneity payoff to reach an evolutionarily stable orbit, should it exist. We rigorously prove that a locally asymptotically stable period orbit must be heterogeneity stable orbit-a generalization of evolutionarily stable state.

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