Controlled Physical Random Functions

Gassend, Blaise; Dijk, Marten van; Clarke, Dwaine; Devadas, Srinivas

doi:10.1007/978-1-84628-984-2_14

Cited by 155 publications

(273 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…This means that the resulting structure will not be manufacturer resistant in the sense of [4], but will at least require a fraudster to possess its own chip foundry. The common SRAM-cell arragement will be contained in the general simulation algorithm Sim, and the individual description D(S) consists of the cells that have been fixed to certain values.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a relatively young, emerging cryptographic primitive [2,3,4,5,6,7]. However, one potential downside of PUF-based protocols is that they usually require a previously shared piece of information (typically some challenge-response-pairs) that was established in a joint set-up phase between the communicants.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Towards Electrical, Integrated Implementations of SIMPL Systems

Rührmair¹,

Chen²,

Stutzmann

et al. 2010

Information Security Theory and Practices. Security and Privacy of Pervasive Systems and Smart Devices

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This paper discusses the practical implementation of a novel security tool termed SIMPL system, which was introduced in [1]. SIMPL systems can be regarded as a public key version of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Like the latter, a SIMPL system S is physically unique and nonreproducible, and implements an individual function F S . In opposition to a PUF, however, a SIMPL system S possesses a publicly known numerical description, which allows its digital simulation and prediction. At the same time, any such simulation must work at a detectably lower speed than the real-time behavior of S. As argued in [1], SIMPL systems have certain practicality and security advantages in comparison to PUFs, certificates of authenticity, physically obfuscated keys, and also to standard mathematical cryptotechniques.In [1], definitions, protocols, and optical implementations of SIMPL systems were presented. This manuscript focuses on concrete electrical, integrated realizations of SIMPL systems, and proposes two potential candidates: SIMPL systems derived from special SRAM-architectures (socalled "skew designs" of SRAM cells), and implementations based on Cellular Non-Linear Networks (CNNs). IntroductionPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a relatively young, emerging cryptographic primitive [2,3,4,5,6,7]. However, one potential downside of PUF-based protocols is that they usually require a previously shared piece of information (typically some challenge-response-pairs) that was established in a joint set-up phase between the communicants. Alternatively, an online connection to a trusted authority at the time of the protocol execution must be employed. In this particular structural aspect, PUFs are resemblant of classical private key systems.In this paper, we are concerned with an alternative security tool called SIMPL systems, which is a public key version of standard PUFs. SIMPL systems have been introduced in [1]. The acronym SIMPL stands for "SIMulation Possible, but Laborious", and hints at the critical security feature of these structures. A physical system S is called a SIMPL system if the following holds:1. It is possible for everyone to numerically simulate and, thus, to predict the physical behaviour of S with very high accuracy. The basis of the simulation is an individual description D(S) of S, and a generic simulation algorithm Sim, which are both publicly known.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Electrical, Integrated Implementations of SIMPL Systems

Rührmair¹,

Chen²,

Stutzmann

et al. 2010

Information Security Theory and Practices. Security and Privacy of Pervasive Systems and Smart Devices

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“…The use of CNNs has its assets on the security side: Since it is based on manufacturing mismatches in CNN fabrication that currently seem unavoidable, it could eventually defeat even attackers with very strong financial resources, and has the potential to create SIMPLs that cannot even be clobed by their own manufacturer (i.e., SIMPLs which are manufacturer resistant in the sense of [29]). On the downside, since CNNs are complex analog circuits, they might be less suited for lowcost applications.…”

Section: B Electrical Simpl Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

SIMPL Systems as a Keyless Cryptographic and Security Primitive

Rührmair

2012

Cryptography and Security: From Theory to Applications

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Abstract-We discuss a recent cryptographic primitive termed SIMPL system. Like Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), SIMPL systems are disordered, unclonable physical systems with many possible inputs and a complex input-output behavior. Contrary to PUFs, however, each SIMPL system comes with a publicly known, individual numeric description that allows its slow simulation and output prediction. While everyone can determine a SIMPL system's output slowly by simulation, only its actual holder can determine the output fast by physical measurement. This added functionality allows new public key like protocols and applications.But SIMPLs have a second, perhaps more striking advantage: No secret information is, or needs to be, contained in SIMPL systems in order to enable cryptographic security. Neither in the form of a standard digital key, nor as secret information hidden in the random, analog features of some hardware, as it is the case for PUFs. The security of SIMPL systems instead rests on (i) an assumption regarding their physical unclonability, and (ii) a computational assumption on the complexity of simulating their output. This provides SIMPL systems with a natural immunity against any key extraction attacks, including malware, side channel, invasive, and modeling attempts.In this manuscript, we give a comprehensive discussion of SIMPLs as a cryptographic and security primitive. Special emphasis is placed on the different cryptographic protocols that are enabled by this new tool.

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“…Gassend et al introduced silicon-based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) in [5], [6]; PUFs generate responses based on device manufacturing variations. Given a challenge as input, a PUF produces a response that is based on manufacturing variations on a particular instance of a silicon device.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lightweight and Secure PUF Key Storage Using Limits of Machine Learning

Yu¹,

M’Raïhi²,

Sowell³

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract.A lightweight and secure key storage scheme using silicon Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) is described. To derive stable PUF bits from chip manufacturing variations, a lightweight error correction code (ECC) encoder / decoder is used. With a register count of 69, this codec core does not use any traditional error correction techniques and is 75% smaller than a previous provably secure implementation, and yet achieves robust environmental performance in 65nm FPGA and 0.13μ ASIC implementations. The security of the syndrome bits uses a new security argument that relies on what cannot be learned from a machine learning perspective. The number of Leaked Bits is determined for each Syndrome Word, reducible using Syndrome Distribution Shaping. The design is secure from a min-entropy standpoint against a machinelearning-equipped adversary that, given a ceiling of leaked bits, has a classification error bounded by . Numerical examples are given using latest machine learning results.

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Controlled Physical Random Functions

Abstract: A Physical Random Function (PUF) is a random func-

Cited by 155 publications

References 2 publications

Towards Electrical, Integrated Implementations of SIMPL Systems

Towards Electrical, Integrated Implementations of SIMPL Systems

SIMPL Systems as a Keyless Cryptographic and Security Primitive

Lightweight and Secure PUF Key Storage Using Limits of Machine Learning

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