2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.04.006
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Control/ownership structure, creditor rights protection, and the cost of debt financing: International evidence

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Cited by 224 publications
(172 citation statements)
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References 60 publications
(91 reference statements)
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“…More specifically, we find that the existence and the enforcement of creditor laws are associated with higher bond rating, hence lower cost debt. This finding supports Ellul et al (2005) and Boubakri and Ghouma (2010).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 91%
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“…More specifically, we find that the existence and the enforcement of creditor laws are associated with higher bond rating, hence lower cost debt. This finding supports Ellul et al (2005) and Boubakri and Ghouma (2010).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 91%
“…Finally, we report a positive and coefficient for NEWS at the 10% level, suggesting that firms from countries with stronger extra-legal institutions are more likely to have higher bond ratings. Overall, these findings which are consistent with Ellul et al (2005) and Boubakri and Ghouma (2010), suggest that high quality legal and extra-legal institutions are associated with higher bond ratings.…”
Section: Multivariate Analysissupporting
confidence: 89%
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“…Masulis et al (2009) show that larger divergence between voting rights and the equity ownership of insiders (i.e., officers and directors) is associated with lower value of cash holdings, higher CEO compensation, value-destroying acquisitions and unprofitable capital expenditures. In support of this agency view, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) find that the cost of borrowing increases with excess control rights. Gompers et al (2010) claim that insiders of dual-class firms often hold voting rights in excess of cash-flow rights, and that U.S. firms are more likely to adopt dual-class status when private benefits of control are relatively high.…”
Section: Excess Control Rights Firms' Geographic Location and Cash Hmentioning
confidence: 92%