Contributions to the 37Ar background by research reactor operations

Fay, A. G.; Biegalski, Steven R

doi:10.1007/s10967-012-1968-7

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In most countries, stack emissions of 41 Ar are continuously monitored. Thus, it would be attractive if the emitted air shows an almost constant 41 Ar: 37 Ar activity ratio, from which the unknown 37 Ar emissions could be easily deduced (Fay and Biegalski, 2013;Johnson et al, 2017). However, our simulations indicate that for pressurized water reactors such a constant ratio can not be expected.…”

Section: Ratios Of 41 Ar To 37 Armentioning

confidence: 85%

Will $^{37}$Ar emissions from light water power reactors become an obstacle to its use for nuclear explosion monitoring?

Kirchner¹,

Gerfen²,

Heise³

et al. 2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

37 Ar is a promising candidate for complementing radioxenon isotopes as indicators of underground nuclear explosions. This study evaluates its potential anthropogenic background caused by emissions from commercial pressurised water reactors. Various 37 Ar production pathways, which result from activation of 36 Ar and of 40 Ca, respectively, are identified and their emissions quantified. In-core processes include (1) the restart of operation and degassing of the primary cooling water after maintenance and refueling shutdown, (2) the replacement of primary coolant water for limiting its tritium concentrations, and (3) the leakage of 37 Ar produced from calcium impurities in UO 2 after fuel rod failures. Activation of air and of calcium in concrete within the biological shield are major out-of-core production pathways. Whereas emissions from in-core processes are transient, a rather constant 37 Ar source term results from its out-of-core production.

show abstract

Section: Ratios Of 41 Ar To 37 Armentioning

confidence: 85%

Will $^{37}$Ar emissions from light water power reactors become an obstacle to its use for nuclear explosion monitoring?

Kirchner¹,

Gerfen²,

Heise³

et al. 2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Measurements performed by (Matuszek et al, 1975) indicate that 37 Ar released from nuclear power plants may be measurable at considerable distances from the release stack. However, more recent theoretical work indicates that research reactors should not be considered a significant source of 37 Ar (Fay and Biegalski, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Production and release rate of 37Ar from the UT TRIGA Mark-II research reactor

Johnson

Biegalski

Artnak

et al. 2017

Journal of Environmental Radioactivity

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Air samples were taken at various locations around The University of Texas at Austin's TRIGA Mark II research reactor and analyzed to determine the concentrations of Ar,Ar, and Xe present. The measured ratio ofAr/Ar and historical records of Ar releases were then utilized to estimate an annual average release rate ofAr from the reactor facility. Using the calculated release rate, atmospheric transport modeling was performed in order to determine the potential impact of research reactor operations on nearby treaty verification activities. Results suggest that small research reactors (∼1 MWt) do not release Ar in concentrations measurable by currently proposed OSI detection equipment.

show abstract