Contractual Governance: Effects of Risk Allocation on Contractors’ Cooperative Behavior in Construction Projects

Zhang, Shuibo; Zhang, Shuaijun; Gao, Ying; Ding, Xiaoming

doi:10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001111

Cited by 93 publications

(98 citation statements)

References 74 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Game theory has been applied in a number of studies to explore the conceptual aspects of construction projects. Zhang et al [55] proposed that the contractor's fairness perception had a positive effect on the contractor's cooperative behavior. Asgari et al [25] developed a cooperative game theoretic framework for joint resource management in construction projects.…”

Section: Stakeholders and Factors Surrounding Sustainable Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Model Based on Cooperative Relationship in Sustainable Construction Projects

Zuo

Zhao

2017

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Considering the cooperative relationship between owners and contractors in sustainable construction projects, as well as the synergistic effects created by cooperative behaviors, a cooperative incentive model was developed using game theory. The model was formulated and analyzed under both non-moral hazard and moral hazard situations. Then, a numerical simulation and example were proposed to verify the conclusions derived from the model. The results showed that the synergistic effect increases the input intensity of one party's resource transfer into the increase of marginal utility of the other party, thus the owner and contractor are willing to enhance their levels of effort. One party's optimal benefit allocation coefficient is positively affected by its own output efficiency, and negatively affected by the other party's output efficiency. The effort level and expected benefits of the owner and contractor can be improved by enhancing the cooperative relationship between the two parties, as well as enhancing the net benefits of a sustainable construction project. The synergistic effect cannot lower the negative effect of moral hazard behaviors during the implementation of sustainable construction projects. Conversely, the higher levels of the cooperative relationship, the wider the gaps amongst the optimal values under both non-moral hazard and moral hazard situations for the levels of effort, expected benefits and net project benefits. Since few studies to date have emphasized the effects of cooperative relationship on sustainable construction projects, this study constructed a game-based incentive model to bridge the gaps. This study contributes significant theoretical and practical insights into the management of cooperation amongst stakeholders, and into the enhancement of the overall benefits of sustainable construction projects.

show abstract

Section: Stakeholders and Factors Surrounding Sustainable Constructionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Model Based on Cooperative Relationship in Sustainable Construction Projects

Zuo

Zhao

2017

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The bootstrapping mediation test methods recommended by Preacher and Hayes () were adopted in this study to test whether relational behavior could be used as a mediating variable. The application of bootstrapped confidence intervals (CIs) can directly address mediation (Zhang, Zhang, Gao, & Ding, ). The indirect effect testing syntax developed by Preacher and Hayes was put into the SPSS Processor to obtain CIs.…”

Section: Analysis and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Task Conflict on Relationship Quality: The Mediating Role of Relational Behavior

Guo

2019

Negotiation Conflict Man Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Previous studies have paid insufficient attention to how interorganizational task conflict affects relationship quality between parties. On the basis of survey data from the construction industry, this study explores the impact of interorganizational task conflict on relationship quality and the mediating role of relational behavior. The empirical results reveal that task conflict affects relationship quality (including satisfaction, trust, and commitment) negatively. Relational behavior has three dimensions: flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity. Information exchange partially mediates the effect of task conflict on satisfaction, trust, and commitment; solidarity plays a partial mediating role in the impact of task conflict on trust and commitment; and flexibility only mediates the impact of task conflict on satisfaction partially. Relational behavior in accordance with relational norms can partially account for the impact of interorganizational task conflict on relationship quality. This paper also provides practical guidance for construction practitioners.

show abstract

“…For instance, Mohebbi and Li [26] proposed a supplier cooperation algorithm and their simulation results show that long-term cooperation between a network of suppliers can increase the average personal profit of the network's members. Zhang et al [27] considered that the owner's contract terms would have a negative impact on the contractor's cooperative behavior, and provide advice to the project owner on better design of the contract. Lu and Hao [28] pointed out that trust and rights are the two necessary mechanisms to promote cooperation among construction partners, and established a model on the relationship between trust and rights.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

et al. 2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The large scale of construction in mega projects leads to significant environmental and socioeconomic impacts; thus, the projects should also exhibit greater social responsibility. Adopting green supply chain management in the construction process is an important way to realize the goal of sustainable development of mega projects. Because the green supply chain behavior during construction is mainly demonstrated by contractors, it is especially important to study the evolutionary trend of their behavior. Thus, to explore the cooperative relationship among contractors, this paper considers a lengthy construction period, multi-agent participation dynamics, and opportunistic behavior—all are key features of mega projects—and establishes an evolutionary game model. Specifically, a replicator dynamic equation is used to describe the long-term effects of the contractor’s decisions. Equilibrium determinants are then analyzed and simulated. The results show that the initial probabilities of the two types of contractors (main contractor and subcontractor) demonstrating opportunistic behaviors have a significant effect on the direction of evolution of the mega project. The main contractor, who dominates the subsidy allocation by the government and project owner, should pay attention to maintaining a balance in the income distribution between him or her and the subcontractor. Additionally, there is an optimal distribution coefficient for the subsidy that minimizes the overall probability of opportunistic behavior. This paper provides a point of reference for the decisions of the main contractor and the subcontractor in the green supply chain of mega projects.

show abstract

Contractual Governance: Effects of Risk Allocation on Contractors’ Cooperative Behavior in Construction Projects

Cited by 93 publications

References 74 publications

Incentive Model Based on Cooperative Relationship in Sustainable Construction Projects

Incentive Model Based on Cooperative Relationship in Sustainable Construction Projects

The Effect of Task Conflict on Relationship Quality: The Mediating Role of Relational Behavior

Contractor Cooperation Mechanism and Evolution of the Green Supply Chain in Mega Projects

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About