Contracting social services in China: The case of the Integrated Family Services Centres in Guangzhou

Abstract

evaluation arrangements and workload-oriented criteria were unable to effectively assess the 10 impact of social work practices. The study concluded that appropriate legislation is required to 11 safeguard the rights of NGOs.

The achievement and predicament of 30-year social work development in Chinese mainland

“…For securing funding support from the local government, these social work agencies have to maintain close bonds with government officials and implement the state's social welfare initiatives in the name of "public welfare" (Cho 2017). Chan and Lei (2017) describe this form of welfare provision as a strategy of welfarist incorporation because it increased Chinese social organisations' financial dependency on the government and leads to political control over NGOs. Leung et al (2012) argue actually the state-led model of social work development and the growing trend of contract-based social service purchases have politicised social work profession in China.…”

Social service purchasing in China: Rationale, features, and risks

“…Most empirical studies have focused on the features of purchasing arrangements in particular regions (Cho, ; Jing & Chen, ; Qi & Guo, ; Wen, ); interactions between government and NGOs (Hasmath & Hsu, ; Huang & Yang, ; Zhao et al., ); and the development of government procurement as a public administrative strategy (Tuan et al., ). In‐depth explorations of particular social services have covered community‐based services (Kwan Chan & Lei, ), labor NGOs (Howell, ), and elderly care (Lin, ). Except for studies by Teets () and Wen (), which each examined government purchasing of education services, and research by Fang and Tang () on children's welfare institutes, little empirical research is available to inform how purchasing arrangements are operating in child welfare.…”

“…() show how local governments convey their intolerance of political risk at the bidding stage and compel NGOs to comply with governments’ political preferences if they want to become contractors. Studies by Kwan Chan & Lei () and Lin () each highlight the capacity for local governments to influence NGOs independence and autonomy, as contracting creates dynamics and resource dependencies which enhance pressure for NGOs to align with political agendas. Additionally, Zhao et al.…”

“…Second, as Shi () has argued, the purchase of service shifts responsibility for meeting welfare goals to the nongovernment sector, without granting sufficient power and support to enable them to thrive. Kwan Chan and Lei () study on integrated family services centers in Guangzhou revealed that the local government treated contracted NGOs as subordinate administrative agencies rather than partners. On this basis, purchasing arrangements may promote dependencies between the NGO sector and the state, framing engagement and NGO resourcing around state welfare provision rather than a rights‐based agenda (Howell ; Wang et al.…”

“…Indeed, some empirical evidence suggests that the core problem is that local governments have had limited capacity to design the projects and manage and regulate service purchasing. Furthermore, local governments seem to have little incentive or pressure to improve their capacity (Kwan Chan & Lei, ; Lin, ; Wen, ). On the other hand, scholars argue that state centrality and administrative bureaucracy are strengthened through the current contract arrangements (Cho, ; Hasmath & Hsu, ; Howell, ; Zhao et al., ).…”