2007
DOI: 10.1007/s10506-007-9046-0
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Contracting agents: legal personality and representation

Abstract: The combined use of computers and telecommunications and the latest evolution in the field of Artificial Intelligence brought along new ways of contracting and of expressing will and declarations. The question is, how far we can go in considering computer intelligence and autonomy, how can we legally deal with a new form of electronic behaviour capable of autonomous action? In the field of contracting, through Intelligent Electronic Agents, there is an imperious need of analysing the question of expression of … Show more

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Cited by 35 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…In any case, it is widely accepted that AI currently comprises "intangible algorithms of which we see the work, not tangible cyborgs that inhabit our world." 73 Although such agents are "capable of multiple and autonomous intervention [sic] in the legal world," 74 such technology is very different from the androids we see in much science fiction 75 and, it is argued, means that current robots and AI should not be seen as legal agents. 76 The point is made by Bartosz Brozek and Marek Jacubiec, who introduce a character know as Mr Y. Mr Y is an android programmed to replicate human behavior, and the authors conclude he is undeserving of moral concern due to the fact he is nothing more than any other technology.…”
Section: Applying the Gewirthian Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In any case, it is widely accepted that AI currently comprises "intangible algorithms of which we see the work, not tangible cyborgs that inhabit our world." 73 Although such agents are "capable of multiple and autonomous intervention [sic] in the legal world," 74 such technology is very different from the androids we see in much science fiction 75 and, it is argued, means that current robots and AI should not be seen as legal agents. 76 The point is made by Bartosz Brozek and Marek Jacubiec, who introduce a character know as Mr Y. Mr Y is an android programmed to replicate human behavior, and the authors conclude he is undeserving of moral concern due to the fact he is nothing more than any other technology.…”
Section: Applying the Gewirthian Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the main features is the modular architecture that the iGenda has. Its open connectivity allows the connection of new modules that follow the protocols [13,14]. Being a multi-agent system, the iGenda allows easy integration of new features and the deployment and removal of agents at once [15].…”
Section: The Igenda Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The debate is not entirely new (Donaldson 1982;May 1983), nor devoid of controversial points (Ewin 1991). Its revival is due to the increasing pervasiveness and autonomy of artificial agents and of hybrid multiagent systems (Wooldridge 2009), both in every day contexts and in business environments (Andrade et al 2004(Andrade et al , 2007Hildebrandt 2008Hildebrandt , 2011Wallach and Allen 2009;Verbeek 2011;Kroes and Verbeek forthcoming). In (Floridi and Sanders 2004), I argued that standard perspectives on ''mindless morality''-ethical issues involving artificial, synthetic or hybrid agents, from companies to webbots-run the risk of remaining unduly constrained by an anthropocentric conception of agency.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%