Contract enforcement in Russian serf society, 1750–1860¹

Abstract

This article examines questions about contract enforcement in the absence of formal legal institutions, using archival evidence for one particular rural society in preemancipation Russia. The evidence presented indicates that enforcement services provided by the local landlord made it possible for Russians from different socioeconomic and legal strata to engage in a wide variety of contractual transactions. However, this system had significant drawbacks in that the poorest serfs could not afford these services and no serf had recourse beyond his local estate.

Institutions, Demography, and Economic Growth

“…672–73, 677). That institutions, such as marriage systems, are embedded in larger institutional frameworks is something we have long emphasized (Dennison 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Ogilvie 2007; Ogilvie and Carus 2014). However, the institutional frameworks in which the EMP was embedded were not ones that invariably facilitated economic growth (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp.…”

“…We have long argued that institutions influence economic outcomes (Ogilvie 2001, 2003, 2011; Dennison and Ogilvie 2007; Dennison 2011a, 2011b, 2013). However, the key institution favoring economic growth in Europe cannot have been the family system (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp.…”

“…In assessing the plausibility of the idea that an economic-growth-induced moderation in English and Dutch marriage ages occurred just at the point at which each country emerged into empirical observability, one must also bear in mind that economic growth can exert countervailing income and substitution effects on marriage behavior (Dennison and Ogilvie 2013, p. 20). A rise in wages increases incomes, encouraging people to consume more of all goods, including marriage, thereby reducing marriage age and celibacy.…”

“…The basic difference between the two papers is that the published article included nearly 2,000 more observations than the working paper. The size of the data set under analysis is clearly described in both papers (Dennison and Ogilvie 2013, pp. 4–16 with Tables 1–3; Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp.…”