Continuous lightweight authentication according group priority and key agreement for Internet of Things

Abstract

In the IoT, authentication is challenged by the limited resources of devices. Most existing continuous authentications require plenty of memory and computing. Also, the time interval between static authentications is fixed, and no attention is paid to the importance of their traffic. Therefore, in this article, we propose a lightweight protocol for mutual authentication between nodes and servers in IoT. To this aim, the nodes have been divided into three priority groups, and for the high priority group, a longer time interval is considered. Each group node at the beginning of the time interval performs static authentication and generates tokens. Continuous authentication is performed until the end of the time interval using this token. High‐priority nodes also perform more continuous authentication instead of static authentication. The proposed method provides privacy‐preserving through node anonymity, forward secrecy without using asynchronous encryption, key agreement. It is resistant to eavesdropping, replay, server spoofing, and impersonation attacks. Also, the proposed method has been verified using BAN logic and AVISPA tools. The computation time of the node and server in authentication has been decreased by 16.8% and 8.7%, respectively, compared with reviewing protocols, and the communication cost is 1902 bits.

Improved Gentry–Halevi's fully homomorphic encryption‐based lightweight privacy preserving scheme for securing medical Internet of Things

“…4 Some of the potential attacks that could be launched over the medical IoT are man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, impersonation attack, eavesdropping attack, gateway device level attack, sensor node level attack, DoS attack, attack against mutual authentication, insider attack and, attack on transaction history information-based user authentication. 5 As the patient medical data contains sensitive and private information, the attackers can try to read the information in a passive attacks or even try modify the sensitive data in active attacks. The primary objective of medical IoT is to ensure that data is only available to legitimate users, which is accomplished through the user authentication process.…”

“…IGHFHE.KeySwitch(C NAND T , KS i ) The switching key "KS i " includes ciphertexts and the secret key is given by SEC * KEY ← [0, 1] n * . The ciphertext "C S NAND T " is found using "C NAND T " and "SEC * KEY " based on Equation (5).…”

LCDMA: Lightweight Cross-Domain Mutual Identity Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things

“…However, this authentication scheme was found to be not only vulnerable to impersonation attacks, denial of service attacks and replay attacks, but also lacked a native password mechanism to detect bad passwords [33], [34]. Sarabi et al [23] proposed a lightweight protocol for mutual authentication between nodes and servers in IoT. Divide nodes into three priority groups, and each group node performs static authentication and generates a token at the beginning of the interval.…”

“…The trusted center also cannot provide trusted traceability services to locate illegal acts, and may not be able to eliminating malicious users. In addition, there exist other schemes based on lightweight cryptographic primitives for identity authentication [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]. However, these schemes have some drawbacks, including lack of intra-or crossdomain authentication capability as well as inability to resist replay attacks, insider attacks, and session key leak attacks.…”