Continuity in how We Think

Abstract

Prawat (2000, 2001) claims that a major discontinuity appeared in John Dewey's thinking in 1915, when Dewey moved away from the thinking of William James to that of Charles Peirce. The change is described as a “dramatic” and “stunning about face” in Dewey's views. We look at one crucial part of Prawat's evidence of discontinuity, the 1910 and 1933 versions of How We Think. Prawat cites passages from the 1933 version to make his case for discontinuity when, often, very similar (even identical) text can be found in the 1910 version. Focusing on Dewey's views on the role of the teacher, the place of aesthetics and ethics in inquiry, the form of concepts, and the generation of ideas, we conclude that Prawat's hypothesis of discontinuity cannot be sustained. The role of the imagination did become more explicit and important in Dewey's work over time, but Prawat fails to see the imagination in Dewey's early work and miscasts development and reconstruction as discontinuity.

What Is Reflection? Looking for Clarity in an Ambiguous Notion

“…For a discussion of the importance of these modifications and their explanation, see Prawat (2000), who argues that they respond to an important change in Dewey's thinking. For a discussion that argues for the continuity in Dewey's thinking between the two versions of How We Think, see Stanic and Russell (2002). This article will work with the later version, of 1933.…”

The Debate Continues: Further Evidence of Discontinuity in Dewey's Philosophy

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Stanic and Russell (2002) present arguments that refute Prawat's two-part thesis that Dewey underwent a dramatic midcareer change in his philosophy and that this change drew heavily on Peirce's metaphysics. In response to this critique, Prawat presents additional evidence to support his claim that a comparison of the 1910 and 1933 versions of How We Think reveals a major change in Dewey's views about inductionism.

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“…They do concede that Dewey changed many of his views about knowledge, inquiry, and the like from early to late in his career but prefer to characterize these changes as evidence of a pattern of continuous reconstruction rather than the discontinuous rethinking of important issues (p. 1229). Stanic and Russell (2002) take exception to many of the comments I make in the two sections mentioned previously. As I explain later, they are particularly critical of my characterization of the source of what I perceive to be the significant discontinuity in Dewey's thinking (i.e., his ''rediscovery'' of Peirce)Fand my attempt to attach a date to that change.…”

“…It is fitting that this debate be waged within the confines of Teachers College Record (TCR), a journal founded by Deweyan scholars.This latest volley in the Dewey wars is this response to a second critique of the discontinuity thesis, titled ''Continuity in How We Think,'' authored by George Stanic and Dee Russell, which appeared in the September 2002 issue of TCR. I start by placing Stanic and Russell's (2002) remarks in some perspective. The bulk of their critique of my 2000 and 2001 articles focuses on an eight and one half-page section titled ''The Peircean Turn: Further Proof,'' which comes at the end of the most recent paper, and a three and one half-page section of the 2000 paper, which contrasts passages present in Dewey's 1910 book How We Think with the reworked versions in his 1933 revision of this piece.…”

“…There are two parts to the argument I present in the 2000 and 2001 TCR articles: First, as indicated, I believe that Dewey underwent a significant-Fyes, even dramaticFmidcareer (i.e., 1915) change in philosophical perspective, and, second, I argue that this change was inspired by, and drew heavily on, the groundbreaking work of Charles Sanders Peirce, a scholar who had completed the lion's share of his own enormous contribution to philosophy some 30 years before Dewey adopted essentially the same approach (i.e., transactional realism). Stanic and Russell (2002), in their effort to refute both parts of this thesis, draw primarily on material included in the two sections referenced previously to challenge both aspects of this thesis. They do concede that Dewey changed many of his views about knowledge, inquiry, and the like from early to late in his career but prefer to characterize these changes as evidence of a pattern of continuous reconstruction rather than the discontinuous rethinking of important issues (p. 1229).…”