Contingent Valuation and Collective Choice

Schläpfer, Felix; Hanley, Nick

doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.2006.00323.x

“…This conclusion has been challenged by Schläpfer (2006), Schläpfer and Hanley (2006). In particular, Schläpfer (2006) argues that the incidences of income elasticities of WTP smaller than unity may be an artifact of the current design of contingent valuation studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods

Baumgärtner

¹

,

Drupp

²

,

Meya

³

et al. 2017

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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“…The only such study to date is based on the fortunate coincidence of a contingent valuation survey conducted a few month prior to an actual referendum on a very similar public financing issue in Switzerland (Roschewitz, 1999;Schläpfer and Hanley, 2006;Schläpfer et al, 2004). The point estimates for the "calibration factor" from this comparison were in the range of 20 to 50, with a conservative lower bound estimate of about 6 (Schläpfer and Hanley, 2006). Since this is the only such study so far, it is difficult to say how characteristics of the survey instrument and the concerned public goods contributed to the overall result.…”

Section: Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…A number of studies have compared votes in referenda with responses to "CV-like" pre-election polls conducted only days before actual ballots (see references in Schläpfer and Hanley, 2006;Schläpfer et al, 2004). All of these studies found that the survey responses were very similar to the actual votes.…”

Section: Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Contingent valuation: A new perspective

Schläpfer

¹

2008

Ecological Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractAfter several decades of academic research on the contingent valuation (CV) method a consistent behavioral explanation of 'hypothetical bias' is still lacking. Based on evidence from economics, economic psychology and the political sciences, I propose an explanation that is based on two simple working hypotheses about respondent behaviour in contingent valuation surveys. The first hypothesis is that survey respondents are unable to form consistent preferences about unfamiliar goods unless the choice context offers reliable, informative cues that can be rationally exploited in simplified heuristics. The second hypothesis is that the probability and impact of strategic responses in dichotomous-choice questions about public goods depends on the extent to which the presented hypothetical costs differ from the actual costs. The literature on hypothetical bias is revisited in the light of these behavioral hypotheses. I find that the hypotheses are generally supported by the empirical data. Moreover, the hypotheses are able to explain several important empirical phenomena that previous research has not been able to explain. In particular, they solve the puzzle that pre-election polls, but not CV surveys, are able to predict actual referendum outcomes, and they explain why income effects on willingness to pay are lower in CV responses than in actual votes. If confirmed by further studies, the hypotheses will have important implications for future research and practice. First, the hypothetical costs presented in the dichotomous choice question should to be close enough to the actual costs to be credible to all respondents. This can be achieved by specifying the costs as a percentage (rather than absolute) change in taxes. Second, the respondents should be given the option to answer based on information about the positions of large parties and interest groups with known political orientation rather than based on the raw policy information. Theory and evidence suggest that this new survey paradigm largely eliminates the fundamental problems of the conventional stated preference methods.

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“…Voters in referenda put more time into thinking about a ballot decision and their incentive to state true preferences is higher as their decisions entail real consequences. Schlaepfer et al (2004) and Schlaepfer and Hanley (2006) compared preferences in surveys conducted before the awareness of a referendum arises with decisions in the referendum and find that preferences indicated in surveys are largely incompatible with referendum outcomes. By analyzing a referendum on the introduction of direct democracy, we avoid challenges of surveys and obtain a direct measure for revealed preferences of voters regarding the support for direct democracy.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Voting for Direct Democracy: Evidence from a Unique Popular Initiative in Bavaria

Arnold

¹

,

Freier

²

,

Pallauf

³

et al. 2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We analyze a constitutional change in the German State of Bavaria where citizens, not politicians, granted themselves more say in politics at the local level through a constitutional initiative at the state level. This institutional setting allows us to focus on revealed preferences for direct democracy and to identify factors which explain this preference. Empirical results suggests support for direct democracy is rather related to dissatisfaction with representative democracy in general than with an elected governing party. Terms of use: Documents in

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Contingent Valuation and Collective Choice

Cited by 29 publications

References 22 publications

Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods

Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods

Contingent valuation: A new perspective

Voting for Direct Democracy: Evidence from a Unique Popular Initiative in Bavaria

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