Contextualism and Disagreement

Kompa, Nikola

doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9663-4

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Alternatively, one might try to semantically model the context-sensitivity at issue (i) as a form of indexicality, the resulting position being a form of indexical contextualism (cf., e.g., Cohen 1999; DeRose 2000; Blome-Tillmann 2014); (ii) as a form of dependency on circumstances of evaluation, resulting in nonindexical contextualism (also known as moderate relativism; cf. MacFarlane 2005MacFarlane , 2007MacFarlane , 2009Kompa 2002Kompa , 2005Kompa , 2014Kompa , 2015Kompa , 2016Kölbel 2008;Récanati 2008); (iii) as a form of assessment sensitivity, issuing in assessment-sensitive relativism (cf. MacFarlane 2005(cf.…”

Section: The Context Sensitivity Of Knowledge Ascriptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 Here are some of the advantages nonindexical contextualism enjoys over indexical contextualism. Nonindexical contextualism helps us to get rid of the problem of lost disagreement: speakers no longer talk past each other as the one affirms what the other denies (Kompa 2015). Also, nonindexical contextualists do not have to attribute semantic blindness (Davis 2007) to seemingly competent speakers.…”

Section: Nonindexical Contextualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards

Kompa

2021

Synthese

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That knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.

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Section: The Context Sensitivity Of Knowledge Ascriptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Nonindexical Contextualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards

Kompa

2021

Synthese

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“…The twenty papers from the 2011-2020 decade are: Baker, Robson (2015), Capraru (2016), Carter (2014), Clapp (2015), Cohnitz, Marques (2014), Colomina-Almiñana (2015), Díaz (2016), Egan (2014), Eriksson, Tiozzo (2016), Hales (2014), Hîncu (2015), Huvenes (2014), Kompa (2015), Lasersohn (2011), López de Sa (2015), Miščević (2018), Moltmann (2012), Odrowąż-Sypniewska (2013), Palmira (2014), andStojanovic (2012).…”

Section: (D)mentioning

confidence: 99%

An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements

Bordonaba-Plou

2021

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According to Cappelen (2012), analytic philosophers have traditionally used two arguments to defend the role of intuitions in philosophy. On the one hand, The Argument from Philosophical Practice claims that analytic philosophers rely on intuitions when defending their theories. On the other hand, The Argument from Intuition Talk contends that intuitions must play a prominent role in analytic philosophy because analytic philosophers use intuition talk profusely. Cappelen (2012) identifies three questions to be considered when assessing the Argument from Intuition Talk: a quantitative question, a centrality question, and an interpretative question. The available studies have mainly focused on the quantitative and interpretative questions. In this paper, I examine the centrality question, taking as a case study the literature on taste disagreementsa topic that has received significant attention in the philosophy of language in the last fifteen years. To this end, I first build a corpus with the most relevant works in the area and then examine the centrality of intuition talk. The results show that the use of intuition talk is central in the literature on taste disagreements, and that intuitions are taken as evidence in favor of a given theory if the theory can account for them.

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“…Out of this limited framework, later researchers (Rees-Miller, 2000;Sifianou, 2012;Angouri, 2012;Netz, 2014;Zhu, 2014;Kompa, 2015) realize the significance of considering particular contexts in elucidating the causes of the variety of disagreement expressions. Social distance, relative power relationship and the severity of impoliteness are all supposed to give way to the specificity of the context.…”

Section: Factors Affecting the Ways Of Raising Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%